Straw v. Facebook
- 3:24-cv-08625
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 16
In Straw v. Facebook, the court dismissed Andrew U.D. Straw’s complaint without prejudice after screening, allowing an amended complaint.
Andrew U.D. Straw’s action against Facebook was dismissed without prejudice after mandatory screening. Straw was allowed to file an amended complaint by October 8, 2025; Facebook was not found immune from monetary relief.
What happened
In Andrew U.D. Straw v. Facebook, Straw sued Facebook after it suspended his longstanding Facebook page. He alleged that the suspension harmed his professional relationships and asserted a California claim involving interference with prospective business relationships, along with references to federal civil-rights and disability laws.
The court found that the complaint did not adequately establish federal jurisdiction or plausibly state a claim. It also found that the allegations did not show Facebook was a state actor or a public entity covered by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court did not find Facebook immune from monetary relief.
The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under the required screening law and granted Straw permission to file an amended complaint by October 8, 2025. The court warned that failure to amend or cure the deficiencies could lead to a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice. The opinion does not name the magistrate judge; the ruling was issued by the court.
The detailed version
- Straw v. Facebook · No. 3:24-cv-08625
- Sept. 8, 2025
Background
Andrew U.D. Straw, representing himself, sued Facebook over the suspension of his longstanding Facebook page. He alleged that the suspension harmed his employment, professional networking, and prospective relationships with potential legal clients. The complaint expressly relied on diversity jurisdiction and asserted a California claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships. It also referred to the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The court had previously allowed Straw to proceed without paying the filing fee. That status required the court to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court explained that screening requires dismissal if a complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money from a defendant immune from such relief. The court also noted that Straw identified himself as an attorney, so it evaluated his allegations without giving them the usual favorable interpretation afforded to self-represented litigants.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The court found that the complaint did not adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. Straw alleged that he was a United States citizen physically overseas in the Philippines, but did not allege that he was a citizen of a particular state or a citizen or subject of the Philippines or another foreign country. The complaint also did not identify what type of legal entity Facebook was or provide the information needed to determine Facebook’s citizenship under the applicable rules for corporations, partnerships, or limited liability companies.
The court also found no adequately pleaded federal-question jurisdiction. The complaint invoked diversity jurisdiction and identified California law as the basis for its tort claim. Although it referred to federal law, the court found that those references did not establish a federal cause of action.
The court separately considered whether the allegations could be broadly read as asserting a civil-rights claim under § 1983. It concluded they could not. Section 1983 generally requires a person acting under state law to deprive someone of a federal right. The court found that the complaint’s conclusory allegations that Facebook cooperated with or acted as an agent of the Indiana Supreme Court did not provide specific facts showing that Facebook was a state actor.
The court likewise considered the references to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It explained that Title II applies to public entities. The court found that the complaint did not allege that Facebook was a public entity or that it otherwise fell within Title II’s coverage.
Failure to State a Claim
The court also dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It treated the asserted California claim as one for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The court found that Straw did not plausibly allege an actual economic relationship with an identified third party, Facebook’s knowledge of such a relationship, actual disruption of the relationship, independently wrongful conduct, or the required intent.
The court also considered negligent interference with prospective economic advantage and found that claim insufficient for the same reasons. In particular, the complaint described possible clients and broad prospective harm but did not identify specific economic relationships or actual disrupted engagements.
Immunity
The court considered whether Facebook was immune from monetary relief. It found that the complaint sought damages from a private entity and contained nothing suggesting that Facebook was immune. Thus, the complaint satisfied the immunity-related portion of the screening statute.
Disposition
The court ordered that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as frivolous for failure to adequately plead subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for relief. The court granted Straw leave to file an amended complaint addressing the identified problems by October 8, 2025. It warned that failure to file an amended complaint or failure to cure the deficiencies could result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed with prejudice, in whole or in part. The opinion does not identify the magistrate judge by name.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.