Bryant v. City of Berkeley

Background

The case arose from a January 2, 2021 encounter between Vincent Bryant and Berkeley police. After Bryant left a Walgreens carrying a chain, a store employee reported that Bryant had stolen items, threatened the employee with the chain, and appeared to be experiencing mental-health-related symptoms. Police encountered Bryant in a courtyard, where he was holding the chain, making threats, and repeatedly refusing commands to drop it.

Sergeant Samantha Speelman, a trained negotiator, tried to engage Bryant for several minutes. After she stopped negotiating, a contact team entered the courtyard with weapons drawn and ordered Bryant to drop the chain. Officers warned that he would be hit with less-lethal force if he did not comply. Bryant moved toward the contact team while still holding the chain. Two less-lethal shots were followed at about the same time by a lethal shot fired by Officer Madison Albrandt, which struck Bryant in the face. Officers then arrested him.

The opinion states that Bryant was found unresponsive in March 2023 and remained in a vegetative state when the motion was filed. The court had appointed his mother, Antonia Bryant, as guardian ad litem. Because Bryant could not testify, the court relied substantially on body-camera footage and the officers’ testimony. The opinion also notes an inconsistency about the incident date in the filings but states that the correct date was January 2, 2021.

Summary-Judgment Standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is proper when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Bryant and did not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility.

Fourth Amendment Claims

Bryant claimed that Albrandt, Sergeant Kevin Kleppe, and Speelman used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants argued that the force was objectively reasonable and that qualified immunity protected them.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court focused on whether Bryant identified precedent clearly establishing that officers in similar circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.

The court held that Bryant had not done so. It distinguished the cases Bryant cited because, unlike the people in those cases, Bryant was holding a chain, had been accused of a serious offense involving the chain, had refused repeated commands to drop it, had received warnings, and had moved toward the contact team. The court also considered the earlier negotiation efforts by Speelman. It concluded that no cited authority made the constitutional question beyond debate in these circumstances.

The court therefore held that qualified immunity barred Bryant’s Fourth Amendment claims and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims. The court stated that several factual disputes identified by Bryant were not material to the qualified-immunity analysis.

Supervisory-Liability Claim

Bryant asserted supervisory liability against Kleppe and Speelman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A supervisor is not automatically liable for a subordinate’s conduct. The court explained that supervisory liability requires personal involvement in the constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and that violation.

Bryant argued that Kleppe ordered Speelman to stop negotiating, that Speelman stopped negotiating, and that Kleppe ordered the contact team to confront Bryant. The court found no record evidence that Kleppe ordered Speelman to stop negotiating. It also held that Speelman’s decision to stop negotiating, after she believed her efforts had failed, was separate from the contact team’s actions and was not itself an unconstitutional use of force. Bryant had not identified evidence showing that either supervisor participated in, directed, or knowingly failed to prevent the alleged constitutional violation.

The court also held that Kleppe and Speelman were entitled to qualified immunity because Bryant had not identified authority showing that they violated a clearly established right. The court granted summary judgment on the supervisory-liability claim.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

Bryant brought a Title II claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the City of Berkeley. To proceed under Title II, he had to show that he was an individual with a disability, meaning that he had a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, had a record of such an impairment, or was regarded as having such an impairment, subject to the statute’s requirements.

Bryant alleged that he had a mental illness and argued that the defendants should have accommodated his mental-health concerns. The court held that he cited no facts or record evidence establishing an ADA-defined disability. He did not identify limitations on major life activities or records of such impairments. The court therefore held that he could not establish the required basis for his ADA claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants on that claim.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

After granting summary judgment on all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bryant’s remaining state-law claims. It found that considerations including judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favored declining jurisdiction. The court dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.

The order states that the defendants’ summary-judgment motion was granted as to the Fourth Amendment and supervisory-liability claims, that summary judgment was also granted on the ADA claim, and that the state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. The order dispensed with docket entry 101.