McIntyre v. Streight

Background

McIntyre is incarcerated at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County and has practiced Islam since 2009. He prays several times a day on the floor, often using a prayer rug, and keeps his rugs off the floor when they are not being used.

On December 31, 2022, Streight, a deputy at the jail, inspected McIntyre’s housing unit for “tents”—towels, blankets, or other items hung to block the view of part of the housing area. Jail policy prohibited tents, so Streight cut them down. One apparent tent obscured McIntyre’s bunk. When Streight cut its string, McIntyre’s prayer rug, which was also hanging from the string, fell to the floor.

McIntyre told Streight that the incident disrespected his religion and asked for a grievance form. Streight believed the rug looked like one owned by the jail and used for detainees’ prayer services. After consulting the Chaplain’s Office, Streight was told that McIntyre did not have permission to keep a jail-owned rug and had not been recognized as Muslim by that office. Streight gave McIntyre a grievance form, gave him a form to seek recognition by the Chaplain’s Office as Muslim, and confiscated the rug as alleged jail property.

McIntyre said the rug belonged to a former detainee who had given it to him. When McIntyre objected to its confiscation and called for another deputy, Streight told him at least three times to back up and pushed him in the chest at least twice. McIntyre continued forward, and Streight took him to the ground. Video showed Streight’s hand around McIntyre’s throat for about one second before he removed it. Streight and another deputy then escorted McIntyre to an isolation cell and forced him inside after he initially refused to enter.

Claims and Analysis

McIntyre alleged violations of his religious and constitutional rights. Streight moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to rule because the record shows no legally sufficient dispute requiring a trial.

Unopposed claims. McIntyre did not oppose the motion as to his claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his food-deprivation claim. The court granted the motion as to those claims.

Excessive force. McIntyre treated the excessive-force claim as involving two incidents: the initial takedown and the later placement in the isolation cell. Streight asserted qualified immunity, a protection that can shield a government official from liability unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established under existing law.

For the initial takedown, the court held that McIntyre did not meet his burden. His briefing identified no cases showing that the alleged violation was clearly established. At oral argument, he relied on a Ninth Circuit decision involving a nonresisting person placed in a chokehold while pinned down by five officers and rendered unconscious. The court found those facts significantly different from this case and concluded that the decision did not clearly establish that Streight’s conduct was excessive force. The court also found that this was not an obvious case in which the unlawfulness of the conduct could be determined without a closely matching precedent. Streight therefore was entitled to qualified immunity on the initial-takedown claim.

The court held that the isolation-cell claim was not pleaded in the complaint and therefore could not support McIntyre’s excessive-force claim. The court added that, even if the claim had been pleaded, the Prison Litigation Reform Act required McIntyre to complete available administrative remedies before bringing the claim. McIntyre conceded at oral argument that the record contained no evidence showing exhaustion of this specific claim.

Free exercise. McIntyre divided this claim into the confiscation of his prayer rug and Streight’s alleged insulting of his religious practice. Streight again asserted qualified immunity.

The court explained that a free-exercise claim requires proof that jail officials substantially burdened the practice of the plaintiff’s religion. A substantial burden is more than an inconvenience; it must pressure a person to act against religious beliefs or substantially change religious conduct.

The court held that the general principles cited by McIntyre did not give Streight fair warning that his conduct violated McIntyre’s religious rights. McIntyre conceded that Streight mistakenly believed the rug belonged to the Chaplain’s Office and that jail policy prohibited unauthorized possession of those rugs. McIntyre’s position was that Streight did not inspect or investigate carefully enough to realize that the rug belonged to McIntyre. The court concluded that the general legal principles did not clearly require that level of investigation and granted Streight qualified immunity on the rug-confiscation claim.

As to the alleged insult, the court assumed, without deciding, that the evidence could show Streight insulted McIntyre’s religious practice. But it found no evidence that the insult placed any specific burden on McIntyre’s religious exercise. Streight therefore was entitled to qualified immunity on the entire free-exercise claim.

Disposition

The court granted Streight’s motion for summary judgment. The opinion does not state a separate dismissal or judgment wording beyond granting the motion.