Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser

Background

Paula Andrea Salcedo Aceros fled to the United States in June 2024 and was briefly detained after entering. Border officials determined that she did not appear to pose a threat to national security, border security, or public safety, and that she had no prior criminal history. They released her on her own recognizance under the immigration detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and issued a notice requiring her to appear in removal proceedings.

Salcedo Aceros complied with her supervision requirements and attended required check-ins. She timely applied for asylum based on gender-based violence. On August 15, 2025, she appeared for a scheduled hearing in San Francisco Immigration Court. After the hearing, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested her in the courthouse hallway and detained her.

She filed a petition challenging her detention and requested emergency relief. The court first issued a temporary restraining order, then considered whether to issue a preliminary injunction, which is a court order providing temporary protection while a case proceeds. The government released her under the temporary restraining order.

Statutory Framework

The court compared two immigration detention provisions. Section 1226 generally permits discretionary detention during full removal proceedings and provides for release and bond-hearing procedures. Section 1225(b)(2), by contrast, requires detention of certain applicants for admission who are seeking admission and are not clearly entitled to be admitted.

The government argued that it could detain Salcedo Aceros under Section 1225(b)(2), even though it had previously placed her in full removal proceedings and released her under Section 1226. The government also argued that Section 1225(b)(2) permitted mandatory detention without the possibility of release on bond.

Due Process Analysis

The court held that Salcedo Aceros had a protected liberty interest in remaining free after the government released her under Section 1226. Her release, together with her compliance with the release conditions, created a reliance interest in continued freedom absent changed circumstances. The government did not argue that circumstances had changed or that she posed a flight risk or danger to the community.

The court rejected the government's attempt to switch detention authorities after the release. It found that Sections 1226(a) and 1225(b) establish inconsistent detention systems: Section 1226 allows discretionary release and procedural protections, while Section 1225(b) generally requires detention. The court concluded that the government could not unilaterally eliminate the protections associated with Section 1226 simply by changing its stated legal basis for detention.

The court separately concluded that Section 1225(b)(2) did not provide a legal basis for detaining Salcedo Aceros. It interpreted the statute's reference to a person who is "seeking admission" as narrower than the government's interpretation, which would treat every noncitizen who had not been lawfully admitted as continuously seeking admission. The court relied on the statutory text, implementing regulations, the overall statutory structure, and legislative history. It found the reasoning of several district courts more persuasive than a recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision adopting the government's interpretation.

Applying the three-factor test for determining what process is constitutionally required, the court found that all factors favored Salcedo Aceros. First, her interest in physical liberty was substantial. Second, the risk of an erroneous detention was high without a hearing. Third, the government had not shown a significant interest that would be harmed by a pre-detention hearing. The court therefore found that she was likely to succeed on her claim, or at least had raised serious questions supporting preliminary relief.

Other Preliminary-Injunction Factors

The court found that re-detention would cause irreparable harm because loss of physical liberty cannot be fully remedied later. It also found that detention could worsen injuries Salcedo Aceros suffered in a car accident and interfere with scheduled medical treatment.

The balance of hardships and the public interest also favored Salcedo Aceros. The court reasoned that a hearing would impose minimal costs and that the government could detain her if it later proved to a neutral decisionmaker that detention was necessary to prevent danger or flight. The court also stated that the public has a strong interest in constitutional protections against unlawful detention.

Ruling

The court granted Salcedo Aceros's request for a preliminary injunction. It enjoined and restrained the government from re-detaining her without a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker and from removing her from the United States pending the proceedings.

The court did not consider Salcedo Aceros's separate substantive due process claims at this stage because the preliminary injunction eliminated the immediate threat of the alleged deprivation.