Donacick v. Bisignano

Background

Karrissa D. applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits on January 16, 2021, alleging disability onset on January 3, 2021. She alleged disability due to polycystic ovarian syndrome, right knee patellofemoral dysfunction, left shoulder tendinopathy, psychogenic seizures, borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder, depression, iron deficiency anemia, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and obesity.

The Social Security Administration denied her application initially, on reconsideration, and after a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ applied the required five-step sequential evaluation under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and found Karrissa D. was not disabled. At step five, the ALJ concluded — supported by vocational expert testimony — that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, given her residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and work experience. The Appeals Council found no basis to change the ALJ's decision.

The ALJ's RFC Determination

Before reaching step four of the analysis, the ALJ assessed Karrissa D.'s RFC — meaning the most she could still do despite her impairments. The ALJ found she could perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and set the following social interaction limits: she could frequently interact with supervisors and co-workers during a training period not to exceed 30 days, after which she was limited to occasional interactions with supervisors and co-workers; she could have occasional interactions with the public; and she was limited to occasional changes in a routine work setting.

The ALJ found the reconsideration psychologist's opinion — which stated Karrissa D. was limited to "brief and superficial workplace interactions" and would work best away from the public — to be "generally persuasive," but deviated from it in two respects: (1) concluding that an "occasional public interactions" limitation was more appropriate than "brief and superficial interactions away from the public," based on evidence that Karrissa D. socializes with friends and family and can shop and travel; and (2) drawing the training period distinction based on her ability to engage with medical providers, a work history showing no issues during initial training periods, and her Door Dash delivery work.

Proceedings Before the Magistrate Judge

Karrissa D. appealed to federal court, arguing the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) creating an illogical training period distinction; (2) failing to properly account for a superficial contact limitation in the RFC; and (3) failing to properly restrict public interaction in the RFC. Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins issued a Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) recommending denial of Karrissa D.'s request for relief and affirmance of the Commissioner's decision. Karrissa D. timely objected.

Standard of Review

The district court reviews properly objected-to portions of an R. & R. de novo (meaning fresh, without deference to the magistrate judge's conclusions) for dispositive motions. However, objections that merely repeat arguments already raised before the magistrate judge are reviewed only for clear error. Judge Tunheim found that Karrissa D.'s objections were restatements of prior arguments and thus subject only to clear error review, but stated that even under de novo review, he found no error.

The court's review of the Commissioner's underlying decision is limited: it may only ask whether the decision is supported by "substantial evidence" — meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. The court may not reverse merely because substantial evidence also exists for a contrary outcome.

Analysis: Training Period Distinction

Karrissa D. argued the training period distinction was unsupported by any medical opinion and lacked substantial evidence. The court rejected both arguments.

On the medical opinion issue, the court noted that while the RFC must be grounded in at least some medical evidence, the ALJ is not limited to medical evidence alone and may accept some but not all of a medical opinion. The ALJ acknowledged the reconsideration psychologist's opinion, found it "generally persuasive," but balanced it against other record evidence supporting a higher capacity for interaction during a training period.

On substantial evidence, the court addressed three specific sub-arguments:

- Pre-onset work history: Karrissa D. argued her pre-disability work history was irrelevant. The court disagreed, citing regulatory authority requiring consideration of all relevant evidence and noting that Karrissa D.'s own testimony — that she can work up to three to six months before stress causes panic attacks and pseudo seizures — directly relied on her past work history and was relevant to her training period capacity.

- Medical provider interactions: Karrissa D. argued the ALJ improperly analogized interactions with medical providers to workplace interactions. The court found no authority for a categorical prohibition and cited another district court decision that found no error in such reliance.

- Door Dash employment: Karrissa D. argued her Door Dash work supported more restrictive limitations because she chose it to minimize social contact. The court acknowledged this interpretation was possible but found the ALJ's contrary conclusion — that delivering food to merchants and customers demonstrated capacity for less-restrictive social interaction — was within the permissible "zone of choice" for the ALJ.

The court also rejected Karrissa D.'s argument that the decrease from frequent to occasional interactions after the training period was a logical inconsistency, finding the ALJ articulated multiple clear reasons for the distinction and that the record as whole supported the decision even if the ALJ's explanation were insufficient.

Karrissa D. argued that Jason L. v. O'Malley, No. 23-184, 2024 WL 965240 (D. Minn. 2024) was "controlling precedent" requiring remand. The court noted it is not bound by other district court decisions and distinguished Jason L. on the grounds that in that case the ALJ failed to explain the deviation from psychologists' opinions, whereas here the ALJ provided explicit reasoning.

Analysis: Superficial and Public Contact Limitations

The court noted that "occasional" (referring to quantity of time with individuals) and "superficial" (referring to quality of interactions) are distinct concepts. Karrissa D. argued the ALJ improperly substituted an occasional contact limitation for a superficial one without adequate justification.

The court found the ALJ did provide justification: the record showed Karrissa D. socializes with friends and family multiple times a week, can shop and travel, engages with medical providers, and picks up and delivers food for Door Dash. The ALJ concluded these facts supported an occasional public interaction limitation as "more appropriate" than a superficial limitation. The court held that the same evidence can logically bear on both the quantity and quality of interactions a claimant is capable of.

The court again distinguished Jason L. and rejected Karrissa D.'s argument regarding Lane v. O'Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024). It found Lane was not inapplicable merely because the ALJ here did not impose explicit qualitative restrictions, since the critical issue — per Jason L. itself — is whether the ALJ justified excluding the superficial limitation, which the ALJ here did.

Because the court upheld the RFC's exclusion of superficial and minimal public contact limitations, it also rejected Karrissa D.'s argument that the ALJ erred in failing to include those limitations in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert.

Disposition

The court overruled Karrissa D.'s objections, adopted the R. & R., denied Karrissa D.'s request for relief, granted the Commissioner's request for relief, and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision denying benefits.