Harrington v. Kijakazi

Background

Matrice R. Harrington applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on June 18, 2020, alleging that she could not function or work as of March 3, 2019. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Erin T. Schmidt found that Harrington was not disabled and could perform jobs available in the economy, including polisher, inspector, and laminator.

The administrative law judge found that Harrington had severe physical and mental impairments, but that they did not meet the required level of severity. The judge determined that Harrington had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform light work with restrictions. Those restrictions included no more than two hours of standing and walking, no kneeling or crawling, limited climbing and stooping, no walking on wet, uneven, or moving surfaces, simple routine tasks, limited interaction with supervisors and coworkers, no tandem tasks with coworkers, and no interaction with the public.

The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Harrington then filed this action and the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision based on the record when the court determines that a party is entitled to judgment without a trial. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright recommended denying Harrington’s motion and granting the Commissioner’s motion.

Harrington’s Objections

Harrington objected to the recommendation on three grounds.

First, she argued that the administrative law judge failed to include limitations identified by Dr. Ann Lovko, a state-agency psychologist. Dr. Lovko stated that Harrington could perform simple, repetitive tasks and would work best alone, in semi-isolation, or in a small group. The court concluded that this opinion did not require restricting Harrington to working alone or in semi-isolation. The court also found that the administrative law judge’s restriction to simple routine tasks was consistent with Dr. Lovko’s opinion and that the judge properly found the opinion only partially persuasive.

Second, Harrington argued that the administrative law judge did not properly consider the supportability of Dr. John O’Regan’s opinion. Supportability is the extent to which objective medical evidence and explanations support a medical opinion. The court found that the administrative law judge adequately considered this factor, even though the explanation could have been more explicit. The judge reasonably found Dr. O’Regan’s opinion unpersuasive because it was not supported by the mostly normal mental-status examination, Harrington’s reports that she was doing well with treating clinicians, her reported activities, and the fact that part of the opinion relied on her physical condition, which was outside the consulting psychologist’s area of expertise.

Third, Harrington argued that the administrative law judge improperly determined that she did not medically need a cane. Dr. Stacy Holberg’s evaluation stated, “Cane for distance or uneven/slippery ground.” The court concluded that this language appeared on a form listing postural limitations and was not an unambiguous opinion that continued cane use was medically necessary. The court also noted that the administrative law judge accounted for related limitations by restricting Harrington to no more than two hours of standing and walking and prohibiting walking on wet, uneven, or moving surfaces.

Court’s Ruling

The court reviewed the properly raised objections to the report and recommendation anew and reviewed the benefit decision under the substantial-evidence standard. Under that standard, the court had to uphold the administrative law judge’s factual findings if the record contained relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support. The court concluded that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Judge John R. Tunheim therefore overruled Harrington’s objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied Harrington’s motion for summary judgment, and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.