Deivaprakash v. Conde Nast Digital
- Lin
- 3:25-cv-04021
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Aaron Deivaprakash v. Condé Nast Digital, Judge Lin denied Condé’s request to seek reconsideration of the earlier order denying dismissal.
Condé Nast Digital’s request for permission to seek reconsideration was denied, and the earlier order denying its motion to dismiss remained in effect. Aaron Deivaprakash’s claims were not dismissed by this order.
What happened
In Aaron Deivaprakash v. Condé Nast Digital, Condé Nast Digital asked for permission to seek reconsideration of the court’s earlier refusal to dismiss Deivaprakash’s claims. Condé argued that a newer appeals-court decision required a different conclusion about whether Deivaprakash had alleged a sufficient privacy injury under California’s privacy law.
The court rejected that argument. It said the newer decision addressed federal constitutional standing, not the separate question of statutory standing under California’s Invasion of Privacy Act. The court also said Deivaprakash had adequately alleged that internet trackers helped create profiles containing personal information about him, which could constitute a privacy injury.
Judge Rita F. Lin denied Condé’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. The earlier order denying Condé’s motion to dismiss therefore remained in place.
The detailed version
- Deivaprakash v. Conde Nast Digital · No. 3:25-cv-04021
- Lin
- Sept. 30, 2025
Background
The court had previously denied Condé Nast Digital’s motion to dismiss. In that motion, Condé argued that Aaron Deivaprakash had not alleged an injury sufficient to establish statutory standing under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA). The court previously disagreed, finding that Deivaprakash sufficiently alleged that internet trackers allowed third parties to create profiles reflecting users’ locations, incomes, preferences, and other characteristics, and that this occurred with respect to him.
Condé then sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. It primarily argued that the Ninth Circuit’s later decision in Popa v. Microsoft Corporation represented a material change in the law. Popa addressed Article III standing, which is the federal constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury, rather than statutory standing under CIPA.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that Popa did not create a material difference in law relevant to Condé’s argument. Popa concerned claims under Pennsylvania law and did not address whether CIPA requires the historical analysis discussed in that decision. The court also said Condé did not explain why Popa’s analysis of federal constitutional standing should be applied to the interpretation of CIPA’s statutory-standing requirement.
The court further concluded that, even if Popa’s historical analysis applied to CIPA, Deivaprakash had sufficiently alleged a privacy injury. Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, the court explained that allegations involving the collection and compilation of personally identifiable browsing history can constitute an injury because CIPA protects a substantive privacy right with historical common-law analogues. The court found Deivaprakash’s allegations—that trackers enabled third parties to generate profiles using his personal information—sufficient under that reasoning.
Condé also suggested that the court had failed to consider a material fact or dispositive legal argument presented before the earlier order. The court rejected that argument because the parties had not presented Popa in their earlier briefing, and because the earlier order had already addressed why Deivaprakash’s allegations likely satisfied the applicable standing requirements.
Disposition
The court DENIED Condé Nast Digital’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. The opinion did not alter the earlier order denying Condé’s motion to dismiss.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.