Luckau v. Sunrun, Inc
- Jon Tigar
- 4:25-cv-01661
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Jeremy Luckau v. Sunrun, Judge Tigar dismissed Luckau’s second claim because he lacked standing, without leave to amend.
The ruling affected Jeremy Luckau’s second claim against Sunrun, Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4).
What happened
In Jeremy Luckau v. Sunrun, Inc., Jeremy Luckau claimed that Sunrun, Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC violated a federal telemarketing regulation by failing to identify the person or entity on whose behalf a call was made. The defendants moved to dismiss that second claim.
The court had previously found that Luckau alleged a concrete injury from receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls but questioned whether that injury was connected to the specific regulatory violation. After reviewing additional briefing, the court concluded that the regulation was part of the procedures for maintaining an internal do-not-call list, and Luckau did not allege that he had asked to be placed on such a list. The court also rejected his proposed additional allegations.
Judge Jon S. Tigar granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Luckau’s second claim and denied leave to amend. The ruling addressed standing and did not decide whether the defendants actually violated the telemarketing regulation.
The detailed version
- Luckau v. Sunrun, Inc · No. 4:25-cv-01661
- Jon Tigar
- Sept. 30, 2025
Background
Defendants Sunrun, Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC moved to dismiss Jeremy Luckau’s second claim for relief. That claim alleged a violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4), a regulation promulgated under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The regulation requires a caller to identify the name of the person or entity on whose behalf a telemarketing call is made, as part of the minimum procedures for maintaining an internal do-not-call list.
In an earlier order, the court held that Luckau had sufficiently alleged a concrete injury by alleging that he received unsolicited telemarketing calls. The court nevertheless indicated that his injury might not be fairly traceable to the alleged violation of Section 64.1200(d)(4), which is required for Article III standing. The court allowed supplemental briefing because the parties’ original briefing had not addressed that traceability issue and some of the cited authority.
The Court’s Analysis
After reviewing the supplemental briefs, the court continued to conclude that Luckau lacked standing to assert the Section 64.1200(d)(4) claim. The court reasoned that Luckau did not allege that he had requested placement on the defendants’ internal do-not-call list. Therefore, even if the defendants had complied with the regulation, that compliance would not have prevented the calls because Luckau would not have been on the list.
The court rejected Luckau’s argument that he suffered several independent injuries, including an inability to determine the purpose of the call, evaluate the message, decide whether to call back, or make a do-not-call request. The court found that the messages allegedly included a company name and phone number, identified the call as responding to a request for solar-energy information, and provided information about how to opt out of marketing calls. The court therefore concluded that the alleged noncompliance did not leave Luckau unable to determine how to make a stop request.
The court also rejected Luckau’s argument that Section 64.1200(d)(4) provided a standalone protection separate from the internal do-not-call-list requirements. Although the cited cases did not specifically address standing under Section 64.1200(d)(4), the court held that the regulation was part of the procedural requirements for maintaining an internal do-not-call list. The court did not find Luckau’s injury fairly traceable to the alleged violation.
Leave to Amend and Disposition
The court had asked Luckau what allegations he would add if the second claim were dismissed for lack of standing. Luckau proposed adding allegations that the defendants’ conduct prevented him from determining the purpose of the call, evaluating the message’s content and truthfulness, and deciding whether to call the person back. The court found that these proposed additions would not sufficiently allege Article III standing under the facts of the case and denied leave to amend.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Luckau’s second claim for relief without leave to amend. The opinion’s ruling was based on standing and traceability; it did not decide whether the defendants violated Section 64.1200(d)(4).
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.