Sequen v. Albarran

Background

Ligia Garcia and Yulisa Alvarado Ambrocio sought protection from possible immigration detention. Garcia, who had been released by the Department of Homeland Security on her own recognizance in March 2024, was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as she left immigration court on September 18, 2025. The court previously ordered her release and barred the government from re-detaining her without notice and a hearing.

Alvarado Ambrocio had also been released on her own recognizance after an initial detention in 2024. ICE agents attempted to arrest her outside immigration court on September 11, 2025, but did not detain her after attorneys intervened and because her breastfeeding infant was present. The government later acknowledged that she likely faced detention after her next immigration-court hearing without court-ordered relief.

The petitioners claimed that detention without prior notice and a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s protection against loss of liberty without fair legal procedures. They asked the court to convert the earlier temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction covering both Garcia and Alvarado Ambrocio.

Threshold arguments

The government argued that an earlier injunction had made related claims moot, that the conditions-of-confinement claims could not be brought through a detention challenge, and that joining multiple habeas petitioners in one case was improper. The court rejected the mootness argument, explaining that the earlier order had not fully resolved the claims. It also said the conditions claims relied on other legal authority and did not affect the requested injunction. The court deferred the joinder issue until the government formally moved to separate the claims.

Due-process analysis

The court concluded that Garcia and Alvarado Ambrocio were likely to succeed on their claim that the Fifth Amendment requires a hearing before ICE could re-detain them. Because the government had previously released them into the United States, the court found that they had a protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody.

The court also held that the petitioners were governed by the discretionary detention framework in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The court reasoned that they were already living in the United States and were not actively seeking admission upon arrival. Under § 1226(a), detention is permitted based on danger to people or property or a likelihood of failing to appear for scheduled proceedings.

Applying the three-factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court found that the petitioners’ liberty interests were substantial, the risk of an unjustified detention without a prior hearing was high, and the government had shown little countervailing interest in detaining them without a hearing. The court declined to decide their separate argument that the government had no valid substantive basis to detain them under any circumstances because the procedural relief resolved their immediate need for protection.

Preliminary-injunction ruling

The court found that the petitioners were likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm without an injunction, including loss of physical liberty and, for Alvarado Ambrocio, possible separation from her breastfeeding child. It further found that the balance of harms and the public interest favored relief.

The court granted the request for a preliminary injunction. During the case, the government may not detain Alvarado Ambrocio or re-detain Garcia without first giving notice and providing a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. At that hearing, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner presents a danger to the community or a flight risk and that no conditions short of detention would adequately address that risk.