Pittman v. City of San Jose

Background

Pro se plaintiff Randy Dewayne Pittman alleged that a breathing impairment prevents him from walking more than 200 feet without risking respiratory distress. He has a disability parking placard issued by Alabama and lives in an apartment building in San José. The building has four parking spaces, none accessible, and the nearest designated accessible on-street space is approximately 1,700 feet away. Pittman alleged that he collapsed while carrying heavy groceries from a parking space about 500 feet from the building.

Pittman alleged that he repeatedly asked City officials to designate an accessible on-street space near his apartment or to modify the City’s code-enforcement program so that his landlord would provide, or let him use, an accessible space in the building’s parking lot. He sued the City and several city officials in their individual and official capacities, asserting claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He also alleged that the officials were liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Preliminary injunction

The court denied Pittman’s motion for a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an order issued before final judgment that requires a party to take, or refrain from taking, specified actions. The court applied a heightened standard because Pittman sought to require the defendants to take affirmative actions, and it concluded that he had not shown that the facts and law clearly favored him.

The court explained that Title II requires public entities to make their overall services, programs, and activities accessible to people with disabilities. It does not necessarily require accessibility at every individual facility or location. Cities have flexibility in making an overall public-parking program accessible and may use accessible spaces at nearby locations rather than alter every existing parking facility.

The court found that Pittman had not shown that the City excluded him from its overall on-street-parking program. His allegations indicated that accessible parking was available within roughly one-third of a mile and that he had been able to park in a public space about 500 feet from his building. The City also had a process for requesting additional accessible parking spaces. The court noted that Pittman might not qualify for that process because his disability placard was issued by Alabama rather than California, but said any such limitation would be based on the state that issued the placard, not on his disability.

The court also rejected Pittman’s argument that Title II required the City to use its regulatory or enforcement authority to compel his landlord, a private actor, to provide an accessible parking space. The court stated that Title II applies to public entities, not private actors, and found no authority establishing that Title II requires a city to force private actors to comply with it. The court distinguished a prior decision requiring reasonable changes to code-enforcement activities when those activities directly discriminate against a person with a disability; it said that decision did not establish an affirmative duty to prevent private actors from excluding people with disabilities when the City had not contributed to the exclusion.

Because Title II and Section 504 are interpreted similarly, the court concluded that Pittman had not shown a clear likelihood of success on either claim. It therefore denied the preliminary injunction without addressing the remaining preliminary-injunction factors.

Screening and dismissal

The court had granted Pittman permission to proceed without paying the filing fee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), it then had to screen the complaint and dismiss it if it failed to state a claim for relief, among other grounds.

The court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under either Title II or Section 504. It did not allege that Pittman was excluded from the City’s overall public-parking program because of his disability. Instead, it alleged that he could not park immediately next to his apartment but could park about 500 and 1,700 feet away. The complaint also did not allege that the defendants contributed to discrimination by the landlord.

Because Pittman was representing himself, the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. The court’s conclusion states that it denied the preliminary-injunction motion, screened and dismissed the complaint, and granted leave to amend. It warned that failure to file an amended complaint by December 1, 2025, would result in dismissal of the case with prejudice.