Pittman v. Landsphere Property Management

Background

Randy Dewayne Pittman, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Landsphere Property Management and property manager Vamsi Musunuru. Pittman alleged that defendants unlawfully failed to create an accessible parking space at his apartment building. He alleged that he has a disability, that a physician certified he could not walk more than 200 feet without stopping to rest, and that he held a disability parking placard issued by Alabama.

According to the complaint, the building had eight residential units and four parking spaces, none of which was accessible. The spaces were assigned to four larger units, and Pittman had not been assigned one. He requested a van- and handicap-accessible space reserved for his exclusive use. He alleged that defendants denied the request and failed to engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation.

Pittman asserted claims under the federal Fair Housing Act, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Civil Code section 54.1, and California statutes concerning declaratory and injunctive relief. He also sought an order requiring defendants to designate an accessible space within 30 feet of his residence entrance, install temporary signage within 48 hours, and complete permanent signage and striping within 14 days of an injunction.

Preliminary-injunction ruling

The court treated Pittman’s request for a temporary restraining order as a motion for a preliminary injunction. Because the requested injunction would require defendants to take action and change the existing situation, the court applied the heightened standard for a mandatory injunction: Pittman had to show that the facts and law clearly favored him.

The court denied the motion. Pittman relied on section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the Fair Housing Act, which requires reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The court found that Pittman had not explained how constructing a new parking space qualified as an accommodation to an existing rule, policy, practice, or service. The court said that the examples generally involved exceptions to existing rules or policies, rather than physical changes to property.

The court instead treated construction of a new parking space as a physical modification governed by section 3604(f)(3)(A). That provision requires the modification to be made at the expense of the person with a disability. Because Pittman had not alleged that defendants refused to create a new space at his expense, the court found that he had not shown a clear likelihood of success. The court therefore denied the preliminary injunction without considering the remaining requirements for such relief.

Fee application and screening

The court granted Pittman’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee because he established that he could not pay the fee due to a lack of employment, savings, or other financial resources.

Because Pittman proceeded without paying the filing fee, the court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2). The court concluded that Pittman failed to state a federal Fair Housing Act claim for the same reasons given in the preliminary-injunction analysis: he had not alleged a failure to accommodate an existing rule, policy, practice, or service, and had not alleged a refusal to permit a modification at his expense.

The remaining claims arose under state law. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims because the federal claim had been dismissed early and the complaint did not identify an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court also concluded that the complaint did not provide a basis for diversity jurisdiction. It noted that the complaint suggested Pittman and Musunuru both resided in California and did not identify the citizenship of the defendants in a way that established complete diversity.

Disposition

The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, granted the application to proceed without paying the filing fee, screened and dismissed the complaint, and granted leave to amend. Pittman was required to file an amended complaint by December 1, 2025, to cure the identified deficiencies.

The order stated that failure to amend by that date would result in dismissal of the case without further leave to amend. It specified that the Fair Housing Act claim would be dismissed with prejudice and the remaining state-law claims would be dismissed without prejudice.