Rothschild v. The Pacific Companies
- Cisneros
- 3:23-cv-01721
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Mayer Amschel Rothschild v. The Pacific Companies, Judge Cisneros granted Caleb Roope’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Mayer Amschel Rothschild’s private-nuisance claim against Caleb Roope was dismissed with prejudice, ending the case; The Pacific Companies was not the defendant named in the operative complaint.
What happened
In Mayer Amschel Rothschild v. The Pacific Companies, Mayer Amschel Rothschild alleged that construction near his former residence caused excessive noise, dust, and disruption. The operative complaint asserted a private-nuisance claim against Caleb Roope, an officer of The Pacific Companies.
Roope argued that Rothschild had not alleged facts connecting Roope personally to the construction, that the claim was filed too late, and that Rothschild had not alleged Roope’s state citizenship to establish federal jurisdiction. Rothschild also filed an unauthorized additional response, which the court struck.
Judge Lisa A. Cisneros granted Roope’s motion to dismiss, denied Rothschild leave to amend, dismissed the Seventh Amended Complaint with prejudice, and directed the clerk to close the case. The court found that Rothschild had not adequately connected Roope to the alleged nuisance, the claim was time-barred, and the complaint did not establish diversity jurisdiction.
The detailed version
- Rothschild v. The Pacific Companies · No. 3:23-cv-01721
- Cisneros
- Oct. 31, 2025
Background
Mayer Amschel Rothschild filed the action in April 2023, initially naming The Pacific Companies as the only defendant. After several amendments and earlier dismissal orders, the court permitted Rothschild to file a Seventh Amended Complaint asserting only a private-nuisance claim. The court had instructed him not to add claims or defendants and required sufficient facts supporting the nuisance claim and federal jurisdiction.
The Seventh Amended Complaint named Caleb Roope, “individually and as an officer of” The Pacific Companies, as the sole defendant. Rothschild alleged that construction activity next to 128 Lorton Avenue caused daily jackhammering, machinery noise, dust, early deliveries, and other disruptions. He alleged that the conditions interfered with working from home and telemedicine visits, worsened his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and caused persistent stress. The complaint stated that the construction was managed by Clarum Communities and directed by Roope and The Pacific Companies, and that an on-site construction manager handled the site.
Roofthe? No. Roope moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Rothschild had not alleged facts showing Roope personally caused or directed the nuisance. Roope also argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint failed to establish diversity jurisdiction because it did not allege where Roope was domiciled. Rothschild opposed the motion and argued that the claim was timely and that Roope was not a new defendant. The court struck Rothschild’s later filing because it was an unauthorized sur-reply and included allegations not contained in the operative complaint.
Private-Nuisance Claim
The court explained that a private-nuisance claim requires facts showing that the defendant caused an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property in which the plaintiff had a possessory interest. A plaintiff seeking damages must also allege substantial actual damage.
The court found that Rothschild plausibly alleged substantial harm and an unreasonable interference from the construction activity. But the court held that he did not allege non-conclusory facts showing that Roope created or assisted in creating the nuisance. The complaint identified the construction site’s supervisor and alleged that Clarum Communities managed the project, but it did not allege specific conduct by Roope directing the disruptive operations. The nuisance claim therefore failed as pleaded against Roope.
Statute of Limitations and Judicial Estoppel
The court applied California’s three-year statute of limitations for nuisance claims. Rothschild had made conflicting statements about when he left 128 Lorton Avenue. The court accepted his explanation that his statement during an earlier hearing—that he moved out in December 2020—was a mistake related to memory issues, so it did not judicially estop him based on that statement.
The court reached a different conclusion about Rothschild’s statement in an Arizona state-court filing that he was living in Scottsdale in July 2021. It held that this statement was inconsistent with his current position that he remained at 128 Lorton until 2023, that Rothschild had persuaded the Arizona court to accept the Arizona-residency position, and that allowing him to change positions would give him an unfair advantage. The court therefore judicially estopped Rothschild from claiming that he lived at 128 Lorton until 2023 and held that the limitations period expired no later than July 2024.
The court also rejected application of the relation-back doctrine. Rothschild had previously named Roope, later removed him, and proceeded against The Pacific Companies alone. The court held that this was not a mistake about Roope’s identity and that Roope’s later addition did not relate back to the original complaint under California law or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). The nuisance claim against Roope was therefore time-barred, providing an additional basis for dismissal.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Because Rothschild asserted only a state-law claim, the court required allegations establishing diversity jurisdiction: citizenship by domicile in different states and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. The court held that Rothschild failed to allege Roope’s domicile and therefore failed to establish diversity jurisdiction.
Disposition
The court granted Roope’s motion to dismiss. It denied Rothschild’s request for leave to amend because he had repeatedly failed to correct previously identified pleading and jurisdictional defects, and because the statute-of-limitations problem could not be cured by amendment. The court dismissed the Seventh Amended Complaint with prejudice and directed the clerk to close the case.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.