Rowell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Background

Brandon Alexander Rowell, proceeding without a lawyer, brought an employment-discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He alleged that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company discriminated against him because of his race and constructively terminated him while he worked at the company’s office in Atlanta, Georgia. He also named James Murphy, gave a New York address for Murphy, and did not otherwise identify Murphy or describe Murphy’s participation in the alleged discrimination.

Rowell alleged that he received a right-to-sue letter on November 25, 2011. The court took notice of public court records showing that Rowell had previously filed a related Title VII action against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in the Northern District of Georgia, docket number 12-CV-0491. In that earlier round of the case, the district court granted Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Venue analysis

For the Title VII claims, the court applied Title VII’s special venue provision. That provision permits an action in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained and administered, or where the person would have worked but for the alleged discrimination. The court concluded that the Northern District of Georgia was a proper venue because the alleged conduct occurred in Georgia and the relevant employment records were likely maintained there. Rowell did not suggest that he would have worked somewhere else but for the alleged discrimination.

For the § 1981 claims, the court concluded that both the Southern District of New York and the Northern District of Georgia appeared to be proper venues. New York was potentially proper because Metropolitan Life Insurance Company maintained its headquarters there and Murphy appeared to reside there. Georgia was also proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Atlanta.

Transfer and disposition

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court may transfer a case filed in a proper venue to another proper venue for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. The court found transfer appropriate because the underlying events occurred in Atlanta, where the plaintiff worked, and where relevant documents and witnesses were reasonably expected to be located. The court also reasoned that the Northern District of Georgia was likely better positioned to consider the new action because of Rowell’s earlier related case there.

The court therefore transferred the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The clerk was directed to carry out the transfer. The New York court stated that a summons would not issue from that court and that the order closed the case there. It left to the transferee court the question whether Rowell could proceed without prepaying fees. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. The opinion does not decide the merits of Rowell’s discrimination claims.