Sternberg v. Hendrickson

Background

Michael C. Sternberg, representing himself and previously asserting claims for himself and his two children, sued several attorneys and their law firms over conduct allegedly occurring during legal representation related to child-custody proceedings involving his children. The children’s claims had been dismissed without prejudice by separate orders, so this order addressed only Sternberg’s claims in his own right.

Sternberg’s operative complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and asserted conspiracy and fraud claims. The attorneys and law firms filed two motions to dismiss: one by Gina Policastri and Lonich Patton Ehrlich Policastri, and one by Magdalena Chattopadhya and Magdalena Law Group.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Sternberg’s Section 1983 claims were not adequately pleaded. Section 1983 generally requires conduct under color of state law, meaning conduct fairly attributable to the state. The court explained that claims against private-practice lawyers who were not acting under color of state law are not actionable under Section 1983. Sternberg’s conclusory allegations that the defendants worked with opposing counsel and judges were insufficient to establish state action.

The court also found the conspiracy claim insufficiently pleaded. The complaint did not specify the legal basis for that claim, but the court analyzed it under Section 1983 because Sternberg’s opposition briefs did so. A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a viable underlying constitutional claim, which Sternberg had not adequately pleaded. The complaint also did not allege facts supporting an inference that the defendants reached an understanding with state officials to deprive Sternberg of his constitutional rights or jointly acted with the state or its agents.

The fraud claim likewise failed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires fraud to be pleaded with particularity. Allegations that an attorney lied about the nature of a hearing, objected to changing a stipulation, promised vigorous representation, and defrauded Sternberg of more than $200,000 did not identify sufficiently the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged misconduct.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It did so based on the pleading deficiencies and did not reach the parties’ remaining arguments. The court denied as moot the Lonich Patton Ehrlich Policastri defendants’ request for judicial notice.

Because Sternberg represented that he could allege additional facts, the court granted him leave to amend. The court stated that it would set a deadline for a second amended complaint after all motions to dismiss, including any forthcoming motion by defendants not yet served, were resolved. The second amended complaint could address the deficiencies identified in the dismissal orders but could not add new substantive allegations, defendants, or claims without defendants’ consent or the court’s permission.