Schneidermesser v. NYU Grossman School of Medicine
- Ho
- 1:21-cv-07179
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Schneidermesser v. NYU Grossman, Judge Ho denied both parties’ motions to reconsider an earlier summary-judgment ruling on age-discrimination claims.
Eileen Schneidermesser and NYU Grossman School of Medicine; the court’s earlier ruling remains unchanged, with the termination-based age-discrimination claims resolved for the defendant and the age-based hostile-work-environment claims remaining unresolved on summary judgment.
What happened
Eileen Schneidermesser sued NYU Grossman School of Medicine over age-based employment discrimination. In an earlier ruling, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on claims that her termination was discriminatory but allowed her hostile-work-environment claims to continue.
Both sides asked the court to reconsider that ruling. Schneidermesser argued that the termination decision may have been influenced by a supervisor’s bias, while NYU Langone argued that the alleged workplace hostility was not serious enough and that Schneidermesser had not properly used the employer’s complaint procedures.
Judge Dale E. Ho denied both motions for reconsideration. The court held that the earlier rulings were not inconsistent and that factual disputes still prevented judgment for the defendant on the hostile-work-environment claims.
The detailed version
- Schneidermesser v. NYU Grossman School of Medicine · No. 1:21-cv-07179
- Ho
- Sept. 25, 2025
Background
The court previously ruled on NYU Grossman School of Medicine’s motion for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide a claim without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact important to the outcome. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on Eileen Schneidermesser’s age-based employment-discrimination claims arising from her termination, but denied summary judgment on her age-based hostile-work-environment claims.
The parties filed cross-motions for reconsideration, an extraordinary request asking the court to revisit an earlier ruling because it overlooked controlling law or important evidence. The court explained that reconsideration is not a way to relitigate old issues, present new theories, or obtain a second hearing on the merits.
Schneidermesser’s Motion
Schneidermesser argued that the court had erred in finding no genuine dispute about the reasons for her termination. She contended that her supervisor harbored discriminatory bias and that other decisionmakers merely approved the supervisor’s decision under a “cat’s paw” theory, meaning that a biased subordinate’s actions allegedly influenced the ultimate decisionmaker.
The court rejected the argument. First, it had not been presented during the summary-judgment briefing. Second, the record showed that NYU Langone’s termination decision followed a lengthy, multistep investigation and relied on complaints from at least three other coworkers, not solely on information from the supervisor. The court stated that the relevant question was what motivated the decisionmakers, not whether every complaint was objectively true. It found no evidence that the termination was based on age or another improper reason, or that the stated reasons were a pretext, meaning a cover for discrimination.
Schneidermesser also argued that the earlier ruling improperly resolved witness credibility on summary judgment. The court disagreed, stating that its decision did not depend on deciding whether the coworkers’ complaints were true. It also noted that her deposition testimony was consistent with the stated reason for her termination and that a later declaration denying that testimony did not create a triable factual dispute.
Finally, Schneidermesser challenged the court’s use of a “but-for” causation standard under the New York State Human Rights Law. The court said the issue did not affect the result because the record showed no factual dispute about the basis for her termination under any causation standard. The court therefore denied Schneidermesser’s motion for reconsideration.
NYU Langone’s Motion
NYU Langone argued that the alleged hostile treatment was not severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment. The court explained that a hostile-work-environment claim has both an objective and a subjective component: the conduct must be serious enough that a reasonable person would view the workplace as hostile or abusive, and the plaintiff must personally have experienced it that way.
The court rejected NYU Langone’s argument that Schneidermesser’s enjoyment of her job showed that she could not have experienced a hostile work environment. The court noted her testimony describing the environment as overwhelming, horrible, terrible, and awful, and stating that she did not want to come to work because of what might be said or done. The court also found that the evidence was inconsistent about whether the comments and conduct were affectionate or hostile. Viewing those uncertainties in Schneidermesser’s favor, the court could not decide as a matter of law that the conduct could not support a hostile-work-environment claim.
NYU Langone also raised the Faragher/Ellerth defense. This defense can protect an employer from liability for workplace harassment when the employer took reasonable steps to prevent and promptly correct the harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to use available preventive or corrective measures. The court declined to consider the defense because NYU Langone had not raised it in its original summary-judgment motion. The court also stated that, in any event, factual disputes existed about both parts of the defense, including whether Schneidermesser used the employer’s antidiscrimination policies.
Disposition
Judge Dale E. Ho denied both parties’ cross-motions for reconsideration. The earlier summary-judgment ruling remained in place: the termination-based age-discrimination claims were resolved for the defendant, while the age-based hostile-work-environment claims were not resolved on summary judgment. The court directed the parties to file a joint status letter addressing their availability for trial in April, May, and June 2026 and estimating the trial length. The clerk was asked to terminate the two reconsideration motions on the docket.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.