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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 4, 2025

Gaskin-El v. 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund

Judge
Loretta Preska
Docket
1:24-cv-01169
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
3
EmploymentCivil ProcedureSummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Gaskin-El v. 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund, Judge Preska denied preclusion and granted Defendant permission to seek summary judgment.

Who this affects

Naomi Gaskin-El and 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund; the case proceeds toward briefing on the defendant’s anticipated summary-judgment motion.

What happened

Naomi Gaskin-El asked the court to prevent 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund from asserting an undue-hardship defense in her Title VII discrimination case. The defendant opposed that request and asked for permission to file a summary-judgment motion.

The court denied Gaskin-El’s request because defendants in Title VII cases in the Second Circuit do not have to specifically plead an undue-hardship defense. The court said any such defense would be evaluated on its merits later.

Judge Loretta A. Preska granted the defendant’s request to file a summary-judgment motion. The parties must jointly submit a proposed briefing schedule by August 11, 2025, instead of filing the previously due proposed pretrial order.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Gaskin-El v. 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund · No. 1:24-cv-01169
Judge
Loretta Preska
Date
Aug. 4, 2025

Background

Naomi Gaskin-El asked the court to prevent 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund from asserting an undue-hardship defense in her Title VII discrimination case. The defendant submitted a pre-motion letter seeking permission to file a motion for summary judgment, which asks the court to resolve a claim without a trial when the law and undisputed facts require that result.

The opinion states that Gaskin-El alleged a genuine religious belief related to her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine, and that this allegation was sufficient to survive the defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss. The court previously stated that the parties should explore through discovery whether her reason for objecting was genuinely religious.

Rulings

The court denied Gaskin-El’s request to preclude the undue-hardship defense. It held that the Second Circuit does not require a defendant in a Title VII discrimination case to specifically plead that defense. The court stated that any undue-hardship defense offered by the defendant would be evaluated on the merits later.

The court granted the defendant’s request to file a motion for summary judgment. It explained that, at that stage, the court would decide as a matter of law whether Gaskin-El presented a genuine dispute of material fact about the sincerity of her religious beliefs sufficient to warrant a trial. The court rejected Gaskin-El’s request to bypass that inquiry.

Next Step Ordered

The parties were ordered to submit a joint proposed briefing schedule for the defendant’s summary-judgment motion by August 11, 2025, instead of submitting the proposed pretrial order that had previously been due on August 18, 2025. This order did not decide the summary-judgment motion itself.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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