Grigsby v. U.S. Department of Justice
- Donna Ryu
- 4:25-cv-00192
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Calvin B. Grigsby v. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, Chief Magistrate Judge Ryu denied leave to seek reconsideration of an earlier summary-judgment ruling.
Calvin B. Grigsby’s request for permission to seek reconsideration was denied. His separate argument about the FBI’s allegedly untimely processing and document production was not resolved on the merits and may be raised at an appropriate later point in the case.
What happened
In Calvin B. Grigsby v. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, Grigsby asked to file a motion reconsidering the court’s earlier denial of his request for expedited handling of a Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Grigsby argued that the earlier order had failed to address a separate claim based on the FBI’s alleged failure to process and produce documents promptly after a determination. The court explained that Grigsby had been allowed to file an early motion only about the FBI’s denial of expedited processing, not as a remedy for allegedly late document processing.
Chief Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu denied Grigsby’s motion. The court said the omitted argument was outside the limited permission for the earlier motion, but stated that Grigsby could raise that argument at an appropriate later point in the case.
The detailed version
- Grigsby v. U.S. Department of Justice · No. 4:25-cv-00192
- Donna Ryu
- Dec. 15, 2025
Background
On May 28, 2025, Grigsby filed a motion for summary judgment seeking expedited processing of his Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The court had previously allowed him to file an early summary-judgment motion only to challenge the denial of expedited processing.
The court denied that earlier motion on August 19, 2025. It found no evidence that the FBI had failed to act diligently because the FBI responded within the statutory deadline. It also found that the FBI properly denied expedited processing because Grigsby had not shown that he met the requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E) or 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e)(1).
Motion for reconsideration
Grigsby sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. He argued that the earlier order addressed only one of two arguments in his summary-judgment motion. The argument he said the court had not addressed was that the FBI’s failure to timely process and produce documents after an October 5, 2022 email entitled him to expedited processing.
Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party seeking permission to request reconsideration of an interlocutory order must show reasonable diligence and one of several specified grounds, such as a previously unknown material difference in fact or law, new material facts or a change in law, or a material fact or dispositive legal argument that the court failed to consider. The rule does not allow a party simply to reargue an argument previously made.
Ruling
Chief Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu denied the motion. The court held that Grigsby’s alleged failure-to-process argument did not concern the FBI’s denial of expedited processing. Instead, it sought expedited processing as a remedy for allegedly untimely processing and document production. Because that argument fell outside the limited scope of the court’s permission to file the early summary-judgment motion, the court held that its failure to make findings about the October 5, 2022 email was not a basis for reconsideration.
The court stated that its ruling was without prejudice to Grigsby’s ability to present the failure-to-process argument at an appropriate point in the case. It also scheduled a further case-management conference for March 18, 2026, and required an updated joint case-management statement by March 11, 2026.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.