Palmer v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

Background

William Palmer brought a negligence claim under sections 905(b) and 933 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b) and 933. He alleged that he was injured on July 27, 2022, when he fell through an open access hatch on NYK Line’s vessel, the NYK VESTA, while working as a refrigerated-container mechanic for Pacific Crane Maintenance Company, LLC.

Palmer was descending an inshore ladder from an upper lashing bridge toward a lower lashing bridge. The lower hatch had previously been closed, but someone opened it while Palmer was on the upper level. Palmer stepped off the ladder assuming the hatch was closed and fell approximately nine feet to the main deck. He testified that he did not look down immediately before stepping off. He later declared that he would have seen the open hatch while looking down from the upper hatch if the area had been painted yellow.

The parties disputed who opened the hatch. Palmer and his coworker, Janiero Baltrip, denied opening it. Evidence showed that Herbert Cadion, the vessel’s second officer, had been checking container locks in the area and that crew members sometimes checked reefer operations. Cadion denied opening the hatch and testified that the crew was not in the area while longshoremen were working. The court treated those factual disputes in Palmer’s favor because NYK Line was seeking summary judgment.

Summary-Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court may not weigh evidence or decide which witnesses are credible. It must view the evidence favorably to the party opposing the motion. Because Palmer opposed the motion, the court viewed the evidence in his favor.

LHWCA Duties

The LHWCA allows an injured longshoreman to sue a vessel for negligence, but not for an injury caused by the negligence of the stevedore or longshoreman. The court applied duties identified in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos: the turnover duty, the active-control and active-involvement duties, and the duty to intervene.

The turnover duty concerns the ship’s condition when cargo operations begin. It includes a duty to provide the vessel and its equipment in a condition that an experienced stevedore could use with reasonable safety. A separate turnover duty to warn applies to hazards that are not known to, obvious to, or reasonably anticipated by a skilled stevedore.

The active-control duty requires a vessel to exercise reasonable care to protect longshoremen from hazards in areas or involving equipment that the vessel actively controls during cargo operations. The active-involvement duty applies when the vessel actively participates in cargo operations. The duty to intervene can arise when the vessel knows of a dangerous condition and knows that the stevedore has failed to correct it after making an obviously unreasonable decision.

Evidentiary Rulings

The court denied as moot NYK Line’s objection to an altered photograph because it did not rely on that photograph in deciding the motion. The court ruled that photographs showing bright yellow paint added to the hatch in 2025 were subsequent remedial measures and could not be used to prove negligence or a defect. The court nevertheless considered photographs showing high-visibility tape for purposes of the motion.

The court denied NYK Line’s request to strike Palmer’s declaration. It found no clear and unambiguous contradiction between his deposition testimony and his later statement about the possible effect of yellow paint. The court did not consider the remedial-measures photograph attached to that declaration.

The court allowed Captain Katharine Sweeney to testify about safety conditions involving hatches and lashing bridges. It struck her testimony about industry standards for crew practices on foreign vessels related to reefer operations because she had not established a basis for those opinions. It also struck her opinion that Cadion most likely opened the hatch because that opinion improperly resolved witness credibility. The court did not consider her opinions about the hatch’s locking mechanism because Palmer conceded they were irrelevant to the summary-judgment motion. The court considered her other testimony, including opinions about the hatch’s visibility and certain safety-code provisions.

Rulings on the Asserted Duties

Turnover Duty of Safe Condition

The court denied summary judgment on this duty. Palmer presented evidence that the faded or missing high-visibility paint, combined with the hatch’s placement at the bottom of a ladder, may have created an unreasonable danger even for an experienced longshoreman. Captain Sweeney described the condition as a dangerous trap, and Cadion testified that high-visibility paint around openings is standard in the industry for safety reasons.

The court rejected NYK Line’s argument that Palmer’s failure to look down necessarily defeated the claim. Whether the hatch was reasonably avoidable and whether its condition was unreasonably dangerous were factual questions. The evidence also created a dispute about whether yellow paint would have allowed Palmer to see the open hatch and avoid the fall. A reasonable jury could therefore find that NYK Line breached its turnover duty of safe condition.

Turnover Duty to Warn

The court granted summary judgment on this duty. Palmer did not argue in opposition that NYK Line breached the duty to warn, so the court treated the issue as conceded.

Active-Control Duty

The court granted summary judgment on this duty. Palmer argued that NYK Line controlled the paint around the hatch before the vessel was turned over to the stevedore. The court held that the active-control duty applies only when the vessel retained and exercised active control over the relevant area during cargo operations. Palmer presented no evidence that NYK Line retained and exercised such control over the paint while longshoremen were working around the hatch.

Active-Involvement Duty

The court denied summary judgment on this duty. Palmer argued that Cadion opened the hatch while checking reefer operations, which would constitute active involvement in the cargo work. Although Cadion denied opening the hatch, the court could not resolve witness credibility at summary judgment.

The court found enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that neither Palmer nor Baltrip opened the hatch and that Cadion may have been the only other person nearby who could have opened it. Palmer did not have to prove definitively at this stage that Cadion opened the hatch; he needed only to show a genuine dispute of material fact.

Duty to Intervene

The court granted summary judgment on this duty. Palmer did not dispute NYK Line’s argument that it had not breached the duty to intervene, so the issue was conceded.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part NYK Line’s motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. It granted partial summary judgment on the turnover duty to warn, the active-control duty, and the duty to intervene. It denied summary judgment on the turnover duty of safe condition and the active-involvement duty. The order did not finally decide whether NYK Line was liable; it left those remaining factual issues for further proceedings.