III v. Schwartz

Background

Edmund K. Gibbons III, appearing without a lawyer, sued Amy Schwartz, James Lane, Kate Franklin, Mayra Cuevas, Lucy James, and Does 1-100. He asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state defamation law. He sought damages and an order barring his exclusion from meditation-center programs and requiring ADA compliance.

Gibbons alleged that he participated in the Kadampa Meditation Center in Texas from 2010 to 2021 and was later excluded from activities in the New Kadampa Tradition network. He alleged that centers in New York, Colorado, Georgia, and Arizona denied or limited his participation in classes, retreats, volunteer activities, and overnight stays. He attributed the exclusions to gossip and rumors about an “expunged legal matter.”

The court had previously allowed Gibbons to proceed without paying filing fees. It therefore screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also noted that it must dismiss claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

ADA Claims

To state a Title III ADA claim, Gibbons had to allege facts showing that he had a disability, that a defendant owned, leased, or operated a place of public accommodation, and that the defendant discriminated against him because of his disability. The court held that his statement that he was a “100% service-connected disabled veteran” was a legal conclusion unsupported by facts describing an impairment, a major life activity, a record of impairment, or treatment as if he had such an impairment.

The court further held that Gibbons had not alleged facts connecting his exclusion to a disability. His complaint instead attributed the exclusions to gossip and rumors about a personal legal matter. The complaint also did not make clear whether he was claiming intentional discrimination, unequal effects from a disability, or denial of a reasonable accommodation. The court therefore dismissed the ADA claims.

The court explained that private plaintiffs may obtain only injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, so Gibbons should not replead a request for ADA damages. It also stated that the complaint named only individuals and that an individual defendant must operate a place of public accommodation to be a proper ADA defendant. If Gibbons amended the ADA claims against individuals, he would need to allege facts explaining those individuals’ relationships with the entities accused of discrimination. The court expressly stated that it had not decided whether the entities involved qualified as public accommodations.

Rehabilitation Act Claims

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by covered programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The court held that the statute does not impose individual liability. It therefore dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claims against Lane, Franklin, James, Schwartz, and Cuevas for failure to state a claim and stated that Gibbons should not replead those claims against the individual defendants.

Defamation Claims

Gibbons invoked diversity jurisdiction and alleged defamation under New York law. The court noted that citizenship depends on domicile, not workplace addresses, and that the diversity analysis could change if Gibbons named entities rather than individuals. The court also noted that it was unclear whether New York law applied to all of the alleged defamation.

The court held that Gibbons had not identified false factual statements published to third parties. It found that Cuevas’s statement that Gibbons had been “acting strange” was alleged to have been made to Gibbons when denying an overnight stay, not to a third party. Similarly, Schwartz’s statement that there were “concerns of violence” was alleged to have been made to Gibbons when denying his retreat application. Gibbons also did not identify what Schwartz allegedly told other administrators. The court therefore dismissed the defamation claim because the complaint did not clearly allege statements published to third parties.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 60 days’ leave to replead. If Gibbons did not file an amended complaint within that period, the court would direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment. The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. The Clerk was directed to keep the matter open until a civil judgment was entered.