C.S. v. New York City Department of Education
C.S., individually, and as Next Friend to Her Child, Y.S., et al. v. New York City Department of Education, The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, Chancellor David Banks, in his official capacity, and The City of New York
- Edgardo Ramos
- 1:24-cv-02111
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 16
C.S. v. New York City Department of Education: Judge Ramos granted the Department’s summary-judgment motion on two students’ tuition claims.
The ruling affected the remaining student plaintiffs D.G.F. and T.I., their parents, and the New York City Department of Education and other named defendants. It denied the students’ requests for the disputed tuition payments and ended the case.
What happened
In C.S., individually, and as Next Friend to Her Child, Y.S., et al. v. New York City Department of Education, two students sought payment for private-school education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s stay-put protections. The school had changed the corporate entity and billing structure through which it provided services.
The defendants sought summary judgment on whether D.G.F. was owed tuition for July 1 through September 14, 2022, and whether T.I. was owed tuition for July 6, 2022. The plaintiffs argued that both students remained at the same school with the same educational services and that the defendants still owed additional payments.
Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the defendants’ motion as to both students. He ruled that the change from RFTS-Learning Center to RFTS-Learning and Developing, LLC, together with the substantial tuition increase, unilaterally changed D.G.F.’s stay-put placement, and that T.I.’s stay-put rights began when the complaint was filed after school hours, making July 6 nonpayable. The court directed the Clerk to close the case.
The detailed version
- C.S. v. New York City Department of Education · No. 1:24-cv-02111
- Edgardo Ramos
- Nov. 19, 2025
Background
The action originally involved 27 students who attended Reach for the Stars, a private school specializing in educating children with autism. Two student plaintiffs remained: D.G.F. and T.I. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to implement administrative decisions requiring education funding, violating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and New York law through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The current dispute concerned “pendency,” also called the stay-put rule. That rule generally requires a school district to maintain a child’s then-current educational placement while an education dispute is pending. Before the 2021–2022 school year, Reach for the Stars operated through RFTS-Learning Center. Beginning that school year, services were provided through RFTS-Learning and Developing, LLC, under a fee-for-services model that substantially increased tuition. The children remained at the same school, but the entities and billing arrangements changed.
D.G.F.’s claim
The defendants sought summary judgment on D.G.F.’s claim for pendency payments from July 1 through September 14, 2022. The defendants argued that D.G.F.’s parents unilaterally changed the pendency placement by contracting with RFTS-Learning and Developing, LLC. They stated that the Department of Education had paid tuition for the period beginning September 15, 2022, through June 2023, in full.
The plaintiffs argued that D.G.F. stayed in the same school, classroom, and educational program, with the same teachers, therapists, curriculum, and related services. They contended that only the school’s billing structure changed and that this change should not eliminate pendency funding.
The court rejected that argument. It held that parents cannot unilaterally modify pendency and that a significant tuition increase can constitute a change in pendency even when the child remains in the same school. The court found no genuine dispute over whether the change from RFTS-Learning Center to RFTS-Learning and Developing, LLC, was the kind of unilateral modification recognized by the Second Circuit as requiring denial of reimbursement. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion as to D.G.F.
T.I.’s claim
The defendants also sought summary judgment on T.I.’s claim for funding for July 6, 2022. The relevant due-process complaint was filed at 6:16 p.m. that day. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants still owed $1,674.99 for that date; the defendants argued that pendency began on July 7, 2022, because the complaint was filed after school hours, and that they had paid the invoiced amount for the 2022–2023 school year.
The court held that the stay-put obligation begins when the administrative complaint is filed. It found no genuine dispute that T.I.’s pendency began on July 7, 2022, because the complaint was filed after school hours on July 6. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to payment for July 6 and granted the defendants’ motion as to T.I.
Disposition
Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The order granted the motion as to both D.G.F. and T.I., directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the listed motions, and closed the case.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.