Melius v. New York City Council

Background

Shana Melius worked as a communications and events manager for Andy King, then a New York City Council member. In March 2019, the Council began investigating harassment allegations involving King’s office. During an interview with a Council compliance officer, Melius described an incident in which another staff member allegedly acted aggressively toward her and reported that King had failed to address the conduct. Melius contended that she also discussed gender-based harassment and discrimination.

The day after Melius acknowledged speaking with investigators at a staff meeting, King’s chief of staff told her that she had to report daily to King’s Bronx District office rather than the Manhattan office. Melius argued that the transfer greatly lengthened her commute, including her travel to medical appointments related to in-vitro fertilization. She later requested schedule changes and permission to work from home or from the Manhattan office during her treatments. The parties disputed what accommodations King provided and whether King or his staff prevented her from working from home or from the Manhattan office on appointment days.

Melius resigned in June 2019. She sued King under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York City Human Rights Law, asserting federal and city retaliation claims and a city-law failure-to-accommodate claim. King moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial that is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about facts that could affect the outcome.

Federal and City Retaliation Claims

The court denied summary judgment on Melius’s federal retaliation claim. It held that a reasonable jury could find that Melius engaged in protected activity by providing information about gender-based harassment to the Council’s compliance officer. The court also held that a jury could find that the transfer to the Bronx was an adverse employment action because it allegedly made Melius’s regular commute substantially longer and increased the difficulty of reaching her fertility-treatment appointments.

The court emphasized that it was not deciding whether Melius’s or King’s account was more credible. It concluded only that the evidence could support a verdict for Melius. The court likewise denied summary judgment on the New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim, explaining that the city law uses a broader retaliation standard than federal law and that factual disputes remained under both standards.

The court did not consider Melius’s separate hostile-work-environment theory because she raised it for the first time in opposition to summary judgment rather than pleading it as a separate claim in her complaint.

Failure to Accommodate

The court also denied summary judgment on Melius’s claim that King failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her infertility treatment under New York City Administrative Code § 8-107(22). The court held that a reasonable jury could find both that Melius qualified for the requested accommodations because of her infertility condition and that King failed to provide an adequate accommodation without showing that the request would have caused undue hardship.

The court noted that Melius did not miss any appointments during the relevant period, but the record indicated that she was late to at least five appointments and that the transfer made travel to her doctor’s office more difficult. The court also considered allegations that King directed Melius to stop communicating with human resources about her accommodation requests. These facts created disputes about whether the accommodation provided was appropriate and whether the requested arrangement would have imposed an undue hardship.

Equitable Estoppel Argument

King argued that Melius should be barred from seeking employment-law protections because, according to King, she made false statements about her residence and criminal history when applying for her job. The court rejected that argument at the summary-judgment stage. It stated that the argument depended on disputed assumptions about whether Melius made false statements, whether she obtained her job through fraud, and whether those circumstances would legally bar her claims. The court concluded that the record was insufficient to support those conclusions as a matter of law.

Disposition

The court denied King’s motion for summary judgment. It directed the parties to appear for a telephonic status conference and directed the clerk to terminate the motion. The opinion did not decide the ultimate merits of Melius’s claims.