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D. Minn.Substantive rulingFiled Jan. 10, 2026

Yulexi T. v. Noem

Full caption

Yulexi T. v. Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and David Easterwood, in his official capacity as Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:26-cv-00068
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
5

Counsel4 of record
PETITIONER
Graham Blair Ojala-Barbour Ojala-Barbour Law Firm
Sara Larson Glesne Ojala-Barbour Law Firm
RESPONDENT
Ana H. Voss United States Attorney's Office
Justin Merak Page DOJ-USAO

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

ImmigrationHabeas
In one sentence

In Yulexi T. v. Noem, Judge Tostrud held Yulexi was wrongly classified for detention and ordered a bond hearing.

Who this affects

Yulexi T., who was ordered to receive a bond hearing; the respondent immigration officials were barred from denying that hearing on the ground that mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applied.

What happened

In Yulexi T. v. Noem, Yulexi T. challenged her detention by immigration authorities. She argued that she was wrongly treated as subject to mandatory detention rather than discretionary detention, which would allow a bond hearing.

The court agreed with Yulexi. It held that the mandatory-detention provision applies to people seeking admission, while the discretionary-detention provision applies to people already in the United States. Because Yulexi had lived in the United States for more than four years, the court ruled that the discretionary provision applied to her.

Judge Tostrud granted Yulexi’s petition, declared that she was not subject to mandatory detention under the admission statute, and ordered the respondents to provide her with a bond hearing. The court did not order her release and did not address her alternative regulatory arguments.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Yulexi T. v. Noem · No. 0:26-cv-00068
Judge
Eric Tostrud
Date
Jan. 10, 2026

Background

Yulexi T. is an Ecuadoran citizen who, according to the opinion, entered the United States without inspection in 2021 and has lived there without authorization since then. Immigration authorities served her with a notice charging her with being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. An immigration judge later denied her asylum application and ordered her removed to Ecuador. Her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals remained pending.

On January 6, 2026, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer arrested Yulexi and detained her. She was initially held in Minnesota and was later moved to a detention facility in Texas. She challenged her detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the federal statute allowing a person to challenge unlawful custody.

Claims and Arguments

Yulexi argued that the government had wrongly classified her under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), a provision the court described as requiring mandatory detention for certain people seeking admission. She argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 instead governed her detention. That provision allows discretionary detention and, under the provision cited in the order, requires an opportunity for a bond hearing. She also argued that denying her a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s due-process guarantee.

The respondents argued that the petition failed on the merits based on their interpretation of the detention statutes. The court rejected that argument. The court also stated that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions cited in a footnote did not prevent it from deciding the narrow question of whether Yulexi was subject to detention under § 1226 or § 1225(b)(2).

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that § 1225(b)(2) applies to applicants “seeking admission,” while § 1226 applies to people already in the country. It determined that Yulexi had lived in the United States for more than four years and that the government’s charging document described her as a person present in the United States who had not been admitted or paroled. Based on those facts and its statutory interpretation, the court held that her detention fell under § 1226 rather than § 1225(b)(2).

The court therefore concluded that Yulexi was subject to discretionary detention and entitled to a bond hearing. Although she alternatively requested release, the court did not grant release. Because she succeeded on her statutory claim, the court did not address her regulatory arguments or whether she could obtain relief under the decision in a separate related proceeding.

Disposition

The court granted Yulexi T.’s petition. It declared that she was not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and was instead subject, if at all, to discretionary detention under § 1226. It enjoined the respondents from denying her a bond hearing on the ground that § 1225(b)(2) applied and ordered them to provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a)(2)(A).

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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