Franco v. Hyatt Corporation doing business as Hyatt Times Square
- Laura Swain
- 1:24-cv-08740
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Franco v. Hyatt, Chief Judge Swain dismissed the action as precluded and denied related requests.
Anthony Franco’s federal employment-related claims were dismissed as barred by claim preclusion; any state-law claims were not heard because the court declined supplemental jurisdiction. Hyatt Corporation was the defendant.
What happened
Anthony Franco sued Hyatt Corporation, doing business as Hyatt Times Square, alleging workplace harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and injuries connected to his 2013–2014 employment. He sought $5 million and represented himself without a lawyer.
The court determined that Franco’s federal claims arose from the same events as claims in his earlier related case against Hyatt. Because that case had already been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court ruled that Franco could not bring those claims again. The court also declined to consider any state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.
Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the action, denied leave to amend, denied Franco’s request for pro bono counsel as moot, and denied him permission to proceed without paying fees on appeal.
The detailed version
- Franco v. Hyatt Corporation doing business as Hyatt Times Square · No. 1:24-cv-08740
- Laura Swain
- Nov. 25, 2025
Background
Anthony Franco, appearing without a lawyer, sued Hyatt Corporation, doing business as Hyatt Times Square. He alleged that his workplace was hostile, that a supervisor harassed him and sought to have him fired, and that he was injured in December 2013. He alleged that he was pressured either to resign while injured or be fired, and he sought $5 million for his injuries, pain and suffering, and lost time.
The court construed the complaint as asserting employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and possible state-law claims. The complaint concerned events occurring during Franco’s employment, through the alleged termination of that employment on January 29, 2014.
Earlier Related Proceeding
The court described an earlier related proceeding against Hyatt involving alleged employment discrimination and the same general employment events. In that proceeding, the court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to state a claim, determined that the claims were time-barred, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over possible state-law claims, and denied leave to replead. The judgment remained final when Franco filed this action. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later dismissed Franco’s appeal as untimely.
Reasoning
The court applied claim preclusion, also called res judicata. Claim preclusion generally prevents a party from bringing a later case based on the same transaction when an earlier case involved the same parties, was decided by a court with authority to hear it, and ended in a final judgment on the merits. A dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a judgment on the merits for this purpose.
The court concluded that Franco’s federal claims in this action—including his Title VII and Family and Medical Leave Act claims—arose from the same employment-related events as the claims he raised or could have raised in the earlier related proceeding. The court therefore dismissed those federal claims under the claim-preclusion doctrine for failure to state a claim.
After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law claims Franco might be asserting.
Disposition
The court dismissed the action under the federal statute governing dismissal of complaints filed without prepaying filing fees. It declined to grant leave to amend because it concluded that amendment could not cure the defects. It denied Franco’s application for the court to request pro bono counsel as moot. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-waiver status for purposes of an appeal. The clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing the action.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.