Rushing v. McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University

Background

Marcus Rushing filed an amended complaint in a lawsuit that the court described as one of four recent cases Rushing initiated in the District of Minnesota. The opinion also identified related litigation in the Northern District of Ohio and at least two state courts. The lawsuits involved overlapping allegations concerning events before and after Rushing’s employment separation from McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University and Wood Health Company.

Rushing alleged that McGaw and Wood Health interfered with his Illinois divorce proceedings and that Wood Health terminated his employment after an outside-the-parties communication with the presiding judicial officer. He also alleged that confidential health information and his address from Minnesota’s Safe-at-Home address-confidentiality program were disclosed. Rushing further claimed that defendants interfered with his access to courts and that CaseMine, Justia, and other online publishers posted false or misleading information about the status of his lawsuits.

Rushing asserted more than fifteen causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with Minnesota statutory and common-law claims. He did not pay the filing fee and applied to proceed without paying it. The court found that he was financially eligible but explained that the federal statute governing such cases requires denial of that application and dismissal when the complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

Federal Claims

The court dismissed Rushing’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for certain violations of federal rights by a person acting under state authority. The court held that the States of Illinois, Ohio, and Minnesota, including their attorney general offices sued in an official capacity, are not persons subject to liability under § 1983. The court also held that Rushing did not plead specific facts showing that the private defendants reached an agreement or had a meeting of the minds with state actors to violate his constitutional rights. Allegations that defendants coordinated across jurisdictions and that judges ruled against him were too conclusory and did not establish that the private entities acted under state authority.

The court also dismissed the § 1981 claim, which addresses racial discrimination affecting contractual relationships. Rushing based that claim on alleged racial discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge connected to his employment with McGaw. The court found that a single statement during a performance evaluation was not tied to an adverse employment decision and did not plausibly show discrimination or retaliation. It also found that the statement did not establish working conditions sufficiently intolerable for constructive discharge and that Rushing did not allege that McGaw intended to force him to resign.

The court dismissed the claims under §§ 1985(2), 1985(3), and 1986. It found that Rushing had not plausibly alleged a conspiracy or facts showing class-based, invidiously discriminatory intent. Because a § 1985 conspiracy is required for a § 1986 claim, the court dismissed the § 1986 claim as well. The court also explained that the jurisdictional and remedial statutes Rushing cited—28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 1367, 2201, and 1651(a)—do not create separate causes of action. To the extent Rushing sought writs or declaratory or equitable relief under those statutes, the court denied those requests as moot.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

Rushing asserted Minnesota claims involving Safe-at-Home confidentiality and privacy, defamation, false light, access to financial records, safeguarding customer information, and deceptive trade practices. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over the state-law claims.

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the entire action be dismissed without prejudice. The federal claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and the state-law claims were not heard because the court declined supplemental jurisdiction. The court denied Rushing’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee, his motion to redact or seal that application, his motion for protective filing of the amended complaint and petition for federal remedy, and his motion for appointment of a special master. The court also warned that repeatedly filing lawsuits against the same defendants about essentially the same subject matter could result in restrictions on filing new litigation in the District of Minnesota without representation by counsel or advance authorization from a judicial officer.