G.G. v. Bisignano

Background

G.G. brought this action seeking review of an unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of Social Security. In July 2024, the court approved the parties’ agreement to send the case back to the agency for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and entered judgment for G.G. After the case was sent back, the Commissioner issued a fully favorable decision in August 2025.

In January 2026, the Social Security Administration notified G.G. that he was entitled to $180,904 in past-due benefits for December 2021 through November 2025. G.G.’s attorney, Terry LaPorte, then moved for $36,026 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), based on a fee agreement providing for 25 percent of the past-due benefits if G.G.’s case was successful.

The record stated that LaPorte had received $9,200 for representing G.G. at the administrative level. LaPorte stated that he could not seek fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act because G.G.’s personal assets exceeded that statute’s maximum. G.G. received the motion and supporting papers but did not object. The Commissioner did not support or oppose the motion, while stating that the court should independently review whether the requested fee was reasonable.

Legal standard

Under § 406(b), a court may award a reasonable fee for an attorney’s representation in court when the claimant receives a favorable judgment. The court may not award more than 25 percent of the claimant’s past-due benefits for the court representation. Contingent-fee agreements are the primary way fees are set, but the court must independently review them to ensure that they produce a reasonable result.

The court evaluates reasonableness by considering the quality of the representation and the result achieved, rather than using a required lodestar calculation based on hours multiplied by an hourly rate. A court may reduce a fee if the attorney provided poor representation, caused delay to increase the past-due benefits, or requested a fee that was too large compared with the time spent.

Court’s analysis

The court found that the fee agreement complied with the 25-percent limit. The $36,026 requested for court representation, together with the $9,200 paid for administrative work, totaled $45,226, which was 25 percent of G.G.’s $180,904 in past-due benefits. The court noted that the requested court fee alone was approximately 20 percent of the past-due benefits.

The court found that LaPorte successfully pursued G.G.’s case and obtained a favorable result that led to substantial past-due benefits. Nothing in the record indicated that his representation was inadequate or that he delayed the case to increase the fee. He had not requested continuances or extensions, and the court found no undue delay.

LaPorte’s time records showed that he spent 34.25 hours on the court case. Although the requested fee produced an hourly rate of more than $1,000, the court explained that an hourly-rate calculation does not control the fee analysis under § 406(b). The court also considered that LaPorte had represented G.G. on a contingency basis since March 2024 and therefore accepted the risk of receiving no fee. The court found no indication that LaPorte could have known G.G. would ultimately receive past-due benefits, and the record showed that no Equal Access to Justice Act fees had been paid.

Disposition

The court found the requested fee reasonable. It granted LaPorte’s motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and awarded him $36,026.