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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled July 7, 2026

Laura A.V. v. Bisignano

Judge
Dulce Foster
Docket
0:25-cv-02546
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
2
Social SecurityFee Petition
In one sentence

In Laura A.V. v. Bisignano, Magistrate Judge Foster granted the plaintiff $9,968.40 in attorney fees and $405 in costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act following a Social Security remand.

Who this affects

Social Security claimants who have successfully obtained a remand of their case and are seeking attorney fees from the government under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as well as attorneys representing such claimants.

What happened

In Laura A.V. v. Bisignano (No. 25-cv-2546), the plaintiff won a remand of her Social Security case back to the agency for further review. After that remand, her attorney filed an unopposed request for fees and costs under a federal law called the Equal Access to Justice Act, which allows winning parties in certain cases against the government to recover their legal fees. The government did not object to paying the fees, but asked the court to direct that $405 in costs be paid specifically from a government fund called the Judgment Fund.

The court reviewed the fee request and found the amount reasonable. The plaintiff originally requested $9,563.40 in fees, but the court ultimately awarded $9,968.40 in fees (the opinion does not explain the difference) plus $405 in costs. The fees may be paid directly to the plaintiff's law firm — Livgard, Lloyd, & Christel PLLP — if the government determines the plaintiff does not owe a preexisting debt to the United States that could be used to offset the award; otherwise, any remaining fees after offset would be paid by check to the plaintiff.

Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster granted the fee motion for $9,968.40 in fees and $405 in costs, but denied the government's specific request to label the $405 in costs as payable from the Judgment Fund, because the government provided no information showing it met the legal requirements for that designation. The government is permitted to pay the fees and costs from whatever funding sources are appropriate under applicable law.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Laura A.V. v. Bisignano · No. 0:25-cv-02546
Judge
Dulce J. Foster
Date
July 7, 2026

Background

The plaintiff, identified only as Laura A.V. pursuant to this district's policy of using only the first name and last initial of Social Security plaintiffs, brought a civil action against Frank Bisignano in his capacity as Commissioner of Social Security. The case was previously remanded — sent back — to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings by an earlier court order (ECF No. 19). The underlying merits of the Social Security dispute are not addressed in this order.

The Fee Motion

Following the remand, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees and costs from the federal government in certain civil actions, provided the government's litigation position was not substantially justified. The plaintiff sought $9,563.40 in attorney fees plus $405.00 in costs.

The defendant (the Commissioner) did not oppose the fee motion, but submitted a specific request (ECF No. 29) asking the court to enter an order directing that the $9,563.40 in attorney fees be paid by the Social Security Administration and the $405.00 in costs be paid from the Judgment Fund — a separate federal appropriation governed by 31 U.S.C. § 1304.

The Court's Rulings

Fee Award

The court found the fee request reasonable based on the plaintiff's supporting submissions and the parties' agreement. The court granted the fee motion and awarded $9,968.40 in fees and $405.00 in costs. The opinion does not explain the discrepancy between the $9,563.40 sought and the $9,968.40 awarded.

Judgment Fund Request

The court denied the government's request to expressly direct that the $405.00 in costs be paid from the Judgment Fund. The court explained that the government provided no information demonstrating it satisfied the legal requirements for a Judgment Fund appropriation under 31 U.S.C. § 1304. The government was permitted to pay the fees and costs from whatever sources are appropriate under applicable law.

Payment and Offset Provisions

Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), the court noted that EAJA fees are subject to offset if the plaintiff owes a preexisting debt to the United States subject to the Treasury Offset Program. The court set out two payment pathways:

1. If the Commissioner determines the plaintiff owes no offsettable debt and agrees to waive the Anti-Assignment Act (a federal law that generally prohibits assignment of government payments), fees will be paid directly to the plaintiff's law firm, Livgard, Lloyd, & Christel PLLP. 2. If there is an offsettable debt, or if the Anti-Assignment Act waiver is unavailable, any remaining fees after offset will be paid by check made out to the plaintiff personally.

In either case, any checks are to be delivered to Livgard, Lloyd, & Christel PLLP, PO Box 14906, Minneapolis, MN 55414.

The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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