Yang v. Mullin

Background

Jor Y. is a native of Laos who entered the United States in 1991 as a refugee and later obtained lawful permanent resident status retroactive to 1991. Approximately 27 years before this case, an immigration judge ordered him removed. However, because the government was unable to execute that removal order, Jor Y. was released on an order of supervision — a conditional release arrangement — and had remained compliant with its terms for 26 years. The government never asked him to complete travel document applications or notified him that removal was imminent.

On February 7, 2026, ICE officers arrested and detained Jor Y. as part of an operation called 'Operation Metro Surge,' described in the record as an aggressive months-long mass-arrest event in Minnesota. ICE provided no warrant and no explanation for the arrest, and never informed Jor Y. that changed circumstances justified revoking his order of supervision. At the time of arrest, ICE had no plan to remove Jor Y. to Laos or any other country and had not obtained travel documents.

The Habeas Petition and Original Ruling

On February 8, 2026, Jor Y., through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal challenge to the lawfulness of his detention. He argued, among other things, that the government violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)–(3), a federal regulation requiring the government to demonstrate changed circumstances before revoking an existing order of release.

The court ordered the government to respond by 11:00 a.m. on February 11, 2026, and separately ordered that Jor Y. not be moved out of the District of Minnesota. In its response, the government acknowledged that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)–(3) governed, but argued it had independent authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 — the federal removal statute — to detain Jor Y., subject to the time limits established in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Critically, the government offered no response whatsoever to Jor Y.'s argument that the revocation of his supervision order violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)–(3).

On February 11, 2026, the court granted the habeas petition, finding that the government had made no showing of changed circumstances as required by the regulation. The court ordered Jor Y. released — with all his property — in Minnesota by 4:00 p.m. on February 12, 2026, and subject only to the conditions of his preexisting order of supervision. The government released Jor Y. on February 12, 2026 at 4:32 p.m.

Post-Release Compliance Issues

Following the release, the government failed to file documentation confirming that Jor Y. had been released without additional conditions, with all his property, and without being moved out of the District of Minnesota. This non-compliance prompted the court to issue two show-cause orders and ultimately to schedule a contempt hearing. During the contempt hearing, Jor Y.'s counsel confirmed on the record that his property had been returned to him.

The EAJA Fee Motion

Jor Y. subsequently moved for attorneys' fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The EAJA permits a prevailing party with a qualifying net worth to recover fees and expenses incurred in a civil action against the United States unless the court finds that the government's position was 'substantially justified' or that special circumstances make an award unjust. The motion must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment.

Jor Y. requested a total of $8,255.00 — $8,250.00 in attorneys' fees and $5.00 in costs.

Respondents' Opposition

The government did not dispute that Jor Y. was the prevailing party. Instead, it argued that its litigation position — specifically, that Zadvydas authorized the detention — was substantially justified. The government also asked the court to reduce any fee award to no more than $1,750, but offered no explanation for how it arrived at that figure and no developed argument in support.

Court's Analysis

The court placed the burden of proving substantial justification on the government, citing Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1995). The substantial justification standard requires that the government's position be 'justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,' citing Bah v. Cangemi, 548 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2008). The standard does not require that the government's position have been correct — only that a reasonable person could have found it justified.

The court rejected the government's defense on three grounds:

1. Failure to respond to the winning argument: The government entirely failed to respond to Jor Y.'s argument under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)–(3) — the argument that ultimately prevailed — when it filed its opposition to the habeas petition. This failure was itself not substantially justified.

2. No justification offered for the underlying conduct: In opposing the EAJA motion, the government made no assertion that its failure to respond to the § 241.13 argument was justified, and offered no argument that its detention of Jor Y. in violation of the regulation was substantially justified.

3. Post-release non-compliance: The government also offered no argument that the conduct giving rise to the two show-cause orders and the contempt hearing — conduct that caused Jor Y.'s counsel to perform additional work — was substantially justified.

Disposition

Judge Bryan granted Jor Y.'s motion for attorneys' fees under the EAJA. The court awarded $8,250.00 in attorneys' fees and $5.00 in costs, and declined to reduce the award to the $1,750 figure the government proposed without adequate explanation.