Kelly v. Patrick J. Kelly

Background

Plaintiff Theodore C. Lockhart, Sr., a self-represented Army veteran, has been a patient at the Minneapolis Veterans Affairs Health Care System (VAHCS) since approximately 2013. He alleges that the three named defendants — Patrick J. Kelly, Leo B. Laub, and Helen T. Paradise, all employees of the Minneapolis VAHCS — engaged in a "systematic abandonment" of his healthcare. Specifically, he alleges that eighteen lines of medical care were allowed to lapse, forty-eight prescribed medications expired without renewal, and he was repeatedly reassigned to new primary care providers without continuity of treatment. He further alleges that after he filed formal grievances, the pattern of care disruptions intensified, forcing him to seek emergency care and incurring over $50,000 in out-of-pocket costs.

Lockhart filed suit in Minnesota state court in January 2026. Defendants removed the case to federal court in February 2026 under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, which allows removal of state court actions in which a federal officer or agency is named as a defendant. Defendants also filed a Certification of Scope of Employment under 38 U.S.C. §§ 7316(c) and 2679(d)(1), certifying that each defendant was acting within the scope of their employment with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs when the alleged conduct occurred.

In his Amended Complaint, Lockhart asserted four claims under Minnesota state law: (1) patient abandonment; (2) disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363A.12; (3) retaliation under the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363A.15; and (4) violation of the Minnesota Patients' Bill of Rights, Minn. Stat. § 144.651. He sued each defendant in both official and personal capacities and sought only injunctive relief (a court order directing or prohibiting conduct), not monetary damages.

Motions Before the Court

Two motions were before the court: (1) Lockhart's Motion to Remand, seeking to return the case to state court; and (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity and that Lockhart failed to state a claim.

Motion to Remand — Denied

The court denied Lockhart's motion to remand. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the United States, federal agencies, and federal officers may remove cases from state to federal court. Lockhart sued defendants in their official capacities as employees of the VAHCS, which is an agency of the United States. Citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), the court held that an official-capacity suit is treated as a suit against the federal entity itself, making removal proper.

Lockhart argued remand was still required because Defendants had not raised a "colorable federal defense" — a threshold required for federal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1). The court disagreed. It found that it could consider federal defenses raised in a motion to dismiss filed after removal, and that Defendants' assertion of sovereign immunity in their Motion to Dismiss constituted a colorable federal defense sufficient to support jurisdiction.

Motion to Dismiss — Granted

The court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine under which the United States government cannot be sued without its consent.

The court applied a facial attack standard — meaning it reviewed only the face of the pleadings and gave Lockhart the same favorable inferences typically afforded to plaintiffs at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Under this standard, Lockhart bore the burden of proving the court had jurisdiction.

The court found that sovereign immunity applies here because the United States is the "real party in interest." Under established Supreme Court precedent (Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)), the United States is the real party in interest when the effect of a judgment would restrain or compel the government to act. Because Lockhart sought only injunctive relief that would restrict what the defendant federal employees do in their official roles, and because those employees were certified as having acted within the scope of their federal employment, the lawsuit was deemed one against the United States itself. Since Lockhart did not identify a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States, his claims are barred.

The court explicitly declined to address whether Lockhart had stated a valid legal claim under Rule 12(b)(6) (the standard for evaluating whether a complaint alleges enough facts to proceed), having already concluded that sovereign immunity requires dismissal.

Disposition

- Lockhart's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 10): DENIED - Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 18): GRANTED - The court ordered that judgment be entered accordingly.