Ramey v. Abot

Background

Scott Ramey previously filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 — a federal law allowing state prisoners to challenge their confinement on constitutional grounds — which the court denied as time-barred. Specifically, the court found that Ramey's filing deadline under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) ran from December 20, 2023 to December 20, 2024, and that Ramey filed approximately 17 months after that deadline ended. The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability (a threshold finding required before a prisoner can appeal a denied habeas petition). This order addresses three post-judgment motions.

Motion 1: Application to Proceed Without Paying Fees (In Forma Pauperis) on Appeal

Ramey applied for leave to proceed without paying appellate filing fees, commonly called "in forma pauperis" or IFP status. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the court must assess both whether the applicant qualifies financially and whether the appeal is taken in good faith (i.e., not frivolous). The court found that Ramey meets the financial threshold and that his appeal, while not meeting the higher bar required for a certificate of appealability, is not frivolous under the Supreme Court's definition of that term. Accordingly, the IFP application was granted.

Motion 2: Motion for Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling is a legal doctrine that can, in extraordinary circumstances, pause or extend a filing deadline when a party was genuinely prevented from filing on time despite diligent efforts. Ramey filed this motion eight days after judgment was entered on his habeas petition. He argued that two sets of extraordinary circumstances justified tolling: (1) a two-week hospitalization for congestive heart failure and kidney failure in November 2022, and (2) losing a tooth and suffering facial lacerations in an inmate attack following that hospitalization.

The court rejected this argument for two independent reasons. First, the court had already considered and rejected equitable tolling when it denied the original habeas petition — Ramey had not raised it himself, but the court addressed it anyway. The present motion contained no new information unavailable to Ramey at the time of his original filing. Second, and more fundamentally, the medical events Ramey cited occurred more than a year before his AEDPA limitations period even began (December 20, 2023). Because those hardships predated the start of his filing window, they could not logically explain why he failed to file within — or even close to — that window. Even crediting some medical incapacity during part of the limitations period, Ramey did not explain how his circumstances prevented him from filing in the approximately 17 months after the deadline closed. The court cited Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), and Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 2017), for the standard that equitable tolling requires both extraordinary circumstances and diligent pursuit of rights. The motion was denied.

Motion 3: Request for Appointment of Counsel

Ramey also requested that the court appoint a lawyer to represent him. The court denied this request, citing the settled rule that there is no general constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction habeas proceedings. The court relied on United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 1999), and Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019).

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson ordered: (1) Ramey's IFP application (Doc. No. 34) is granted; (2) Ramey's motion for equitable tolling (Doc. No. 27) is denied; and (3) Ramey's request for appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 37) is denied.