Zigler v. Lyft

Background

Plaintiffs filed suit against Lyft, Inc., and the case is before the district court with discovery matters referred to Magistrate Judge Westmore. On July 28, 2026, the parties submitted a joint discovery letter (Dkt. No. 81) disputing the scope of discovery permitted in connection with Lyft's pending motion to compel arbitration — a motion asking the court to order the dispute resolved through private arbitration rather than litigation.

The Discovery Dispute

In anticipation of Lyft's motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories (formal written questions requiring written answers under oath). The core dispute centered on Interrogatory Nos. 9–11, which asked Lyft to provide information about whether Lyft has itself pursued claims against other customers under its December 2024 Terms' dispute resolution provisions. Plaintiffs intended to use this information to argue that the terms lack mutuality — i.e., that the arbitration clause binds customers but is not equally applied to Lyft — which can support a finding of substantive unconscionability under California contract law.

A secondary dispute concerned interrogatories Lyft itself had propounded, but Lyft stated it would withdraw those responses if the court ruled that no further discovery was warranted on these issues.

Applicable Legal Framework

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) favors quick resolution of motions to enforce arbitration clauses and limits discovery in that context to situations where "the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue." 9 U.S.C. § 4; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have allowed discovery relevant to unconscionability when opposing a motion to compel arbitration, but that discovery is typically limited to whether the plaintiff's specific agreement was unconscionable — not to information about other customers' agreements, disputes, arbitrations, or lawsuits. The court cited its own recent decision in a related matter, Ye v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 26-CV-01744-KAW, 2026 WL 2180145 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2026), for this narrower scope.

The Court's Analysis

The court sided with Lyft on both of plaintiffs' main points.

Post-formation conduct is irrelevant to unconscionability. Lyft argued — and the court agreed — that unconscionability is assessed at the time of contract formation, not based on what a party does afterward. The December 2024 Terms, on their face, require both Lyft and its users to arbitrate disputes and participate in the pre-arbitration process. How many times Lyft has actually invoked those terms post-formation has no bearing on whether the terms were unconscionable when the contract was made.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Bielski v. Coinbase was misplaced. In Bielski v. Coinbase, 87 F.4th 1003 (9th Cir. 2023), the arbitration clause bound only users — not the company — to the pre-arbitration dispute procedures. Even in that more extreme scenario, the Ninth Circuit found that the lack of mutuality was not sufficient to render the terms substantively unconscionable. Here, where the 2024 Terms facially bind both parties, the plaintiffs' argument for needing post-formation conduct data is even weaker.

Scope of permissible discovery. The court also found that the information sought — claims brought against or by other customers — falls outside the permissible scope of discovery in this context, which is limited to the plaintiffs' own agreement.

Disposition

The court denied plaintiffs' request to compel supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 9–11. As a consequence, Lyft's reciprocal discovery requests were deemed withdrawn. The order resolves Dkt. No. 81.