Arroyo v. Google LLC

Background

Plaintiff Nicole Arroyo brought a single claim against Defendant Google LLC under the Arizona Telephone, Utility and Communication Service Records Act (TUCSRA), Arizona Revised Statutes § 44-1376 et seq. Her claim arose from the alleged use of Google's Cloud Contact Center AI (CCAI) product during calls she placed to Verizon's customer service line. Arroyo alleged that neither Google nor Verizon informed customers that CCAI was listening to and recording calls, and that neither company obtained her prior consent — express or otherwise — to allow Google to access her telephone records.

Google moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Arroyo was bound by an arbitration agreement she had entered into with Verizon (a non-party to this lawsuit). Arroyo did not dispute that she had accepted Verizon's Customer Agreement on December 16, 2024, nor that she had accepted Verizon's Privacy Policy, which was incorporated by reference into the Customer Agreement. The Customer Agreement required arbitration of "any dispute that in any way relates to or arises out of" the agreement, including claims for "invasion of privacy."

The Legal Question: Can a Non-Signatory Compel Arbitration?

The sole dispute was whether Google — which did not sign Arroyo's agreement with Verizon — could enforce that arbitration clause against Arroyo. The court applied Arizona's alternative estoppel doctrine, which allows a non-party to an arbitration agreement (a "non-signatory") to compel arbitration when two conditions are met: (1) each of the plaintiff's claims against the non-signatory makes reference to or presumes the existence of the written agreement, and (2) the non-signatory's conduct is intertwined with that of parties who did sign the agreement.

The court cited Shivkov v. Artex Risk Solutions, Inc., 974 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020), as the governing framework, which itself draws on Arizona state court precedent.

Application of the Doctrine

The court found that Arroyo's TUCSRA claim satisfied both prongs of the alternative estoppel test.

First, to state a claim under TUCSRA, Arroyo was required to establish, among other things, that Google lacked "authorization of the customer" or acted in a fraudulent, deceptive, or false manner. Her complaint alleged that neither Google nor Verizon disclosed CCAI's presence and that neither obtained her prior consent. This meant that to prove her claim, a factfinder would necessarily have to examine what Verizon's Customer Agreement and Privacy Policy authorized — those documents describe Verizon's data collection practices, disclose use of artificial intelligence to deliver services, and address information-sharing with service providers and third parties.

Second, Google's conduct was intertwined with Verizon's: Verizon (a signatory to the arbitration agreement) had allegedly procured Google's services to operate its customer service line.

The court rejected Arroyo's argument that authorization was merely an affirmative defense — for which Google would bear the burden of proof — and therefore should not trigger the estoppel analysis. The court found this argument inconsistent with the statutory language cited in Arroyo's own complaint, which identified lack of authorization as an element Arroyo must establish, and noted that Arroyo provided no case law supporting her characterization.

Arroyo also argued by analogy to Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017), in which the Ninth Circuit held that consent is an affirmative defense under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The court rejected this analogy, explaining that Van Patten's holding rested on a specific Federal Communications Commission order interpreting the TCPA's language in light of that statute's legislative history — and that Arroyo offered no basis for importing that analysis into the Arizona TUCSRA.

The court noted but did not reach a separate, independent Arizona estoppel test requiring a close relationship between the non-signatory and a signatory, because the alternative estoppel basis was sufficient.

Disposition

- Motion to Compel Arbitration (Dkt. No. 26): GRANTED. The case is STAYED pending resolution of arbitration proceedings. - Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 27): DENIED without prejudice, in light of the stay. - Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 36): DENIED without prejudice, in light of the stay.

The parties were ordered to file joint status reports every 180 days and a status report within 14 days of the completion of arbitration. The first status report is due by February 16, 2027.