Estate of Jose Manuel Zamudio, and others v. County of Monterey, and others

Background

On January 29, 2025, Jose Manuel Zamudio was involved in an altercation and was spotted driving along a highway, prompting a response from Monterey County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) deputies. After Zamudio drove off the highway into an agricultural field and exited his vehicle, deputies Meilan, Herrera-Ponce, and Scariot shot and killed him. The complaint alleges Zamudio did not make verbal threats or engage in conduct that would lead the deputies to believe there was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Zamudio allegedly suffered from mental health conditions.

The Estate of Jose Manuel Zamudio and others (Plaintiffs) filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against County of Monterey, MCSO, and Deputies Meilan, Herrera-Ponce, and Scariot. The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC's fourth (failure to train), fifth (ratification), and sixth (ADA) claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) — which tests whether a complaint contains enough facts to state a plausible legal claim — and also moved to dismiss MCSO as duplicative of the County.

Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Legal conclusions alone, without supporting factual allegations, are not sufficient to survive dismissal. If a motion to dismiss is granted, the court should grant leave to amend unless the deficiency cannot possibly be cured.

Analysis

MCSO as a Defendant

Defendants argued that MCSO should be dismissed as duplicative of Monterey County because both are subject to the same Monell municipal liability theory (the doctrine, derived from Monell v. Department of Social Services, that allows local governments to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from official policies or customs). The court rejected this argument. It distinguished the authority defendants cited, which addressed dismissal of individual sheriffs sued in their official capacities rather than a sheriff's office as an entity. The court noted that courts in the Ninth Circuit have permitted § 1983 suits to proceed against both a sheriff's department and its county, and that there is no rule of law requiring dismissal of a municipal entity as duplicative. The motion to dismiss MCSO was denied.

Fourth Claim: Failure to Train (Denied)

To state a failure-to-train claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutional right; (2) that the municipality had a training policy amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons its officers would encounter; and (3) that the constitutional injury would have been avoided with proper training. A municipality is deliberately indifferent when the need for better training is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in constitutional violations that policymakers can reasonably be said to have been on notice. Deliberate indifference can be inferred from a single incident when the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train are patently obvious.

The court found that Plaintiffs sufficiently stated this claim. The FAC alleged that Defendants failed to train officers on use of deadly force against people who do not pose an immediate threat, de-escalation techniques, and non-lethal alternatives — failures that allegedly resulted in Zamudio's fatal shooting. The court held that this failure was so obvious that even this single incident was enough to plausibly allege deliberate indifference. The motion to dismiss this claim was denied.

Fifth Claim: Ratification (Granted — Leave to Amend)

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision and its basis, which requires knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation and affirmative approval. Mere knowledge without approval is insufficient.

The court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts. The FAC alleged only that Defendants' failure to address systemic unconstitutional customs amounted to ratification, but did not allege any affirmative or deliberate conduct by any official with policy-making authority. The court characterized these as bare legal conclusions tracking the legal standard rather than factual allegations. The ratification claim was dismissed, but Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend. The court also noted it intends to allow Plaintiffs to take discovery before further amending this claim.

Sixth Claim: ADA Failure to Accommodate (Granted — Leave to Amend)

To state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the person had a disability; (2) the person was otherwise qualified to receive the benefit of a public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the person was excluded from or denied those benefits or otherwise discriminated against; and (4) the denial or discrimination was by reason of the disability. Courts have required plaintiffs alleging mental disability to plead a specific, recognized mental or physical illness with some factual specificity.

The court found Plaintiffs' allegations insufficient. The FAC alleged only that Zamudio suffered from a "mental illness" without specifying whether that illness qualified as a disability under the ADA. The ADA claim was dismissed, with leave to amend because additional facts could cure the deficiency.

Disposition

The motion to dismiss was granted in part as to the fifth (ratification) and sixth (ADA) claims, and denied in part as to the fourth (failure to train) claim and MCSO. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint by October 5, 2026, and may not add claims or parties without leave of court. Defendants must respond to the amended complaint within fourteen days of its filing.