Hawthorne v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Cheryl Hawthorne sustained a work-related injury in 2008 and continued working as an administrative assistant until 2012, when she was let go because she required too many workplace accommodations. She applied for disability benefits on February 10, 2014, alleging disability beginning July 19, 2012. The claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels and then denied by an ALJ in February 2017. The Appeals Council denied review in December 2017.

Hawthorne sought federal district court review, which resulted in a remand for further administrative proceedings in June 2019. On remand, the ALJ again found Hawthorne not disabled. The district court denied her subsequent appeal. The Ninth Circuit then granted a joint motion by the parties to remand again for further administrative proceedings.

The ALJ held a hearing in August 2025 at which Hawthorne testified along with two medical experts: Dr. Frank Myers and Dr. Linda Miller. On September 9, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision denying Hawthorne's applications for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (SSA), finding she was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the SSA for the closed period from July 19, 2012, to February 16, 2017.

The ALJ's Error: Failure to Address Dr. Miller's Testimony

The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Myers' opinion, finding his limitations were not fully consistent with the treatment record, and gave partial or little weight to several examining doctors. However, the ALJ's written decision entirely omitted any discussion of Dr. Miller's medical opinion. Dr. Miller had testified that Hawthorne: - Was limited to simple and repetitive tasks with no strict time requirement, no collaboration, and only moderate noise; - Would need a twenty-minute break approximately every two hours due to low stress tolerance, major depressive disorder, and the effects of chronic pain on her nervous system; and - May require more frequent breaks after mid-afternoon because people with chronic pain can become fatigued, particularly when combined with major depressive disorder.

The Commissioner conceded that the ALJ's failure to address Dr. Miller's testimony constituted legal error requiring remand at minimum, citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

The Legal Framework: Remand for Further Proceedings vs. Immediate Award of Benefits

The central dispute was the appropriate remedy. Under Ninth Circuit precedent: - If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, the case should be remanded for further proceedings. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). - If the record is fully developed and further proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the court should remand for an immediate award of benefits. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004).

An immediate award of benefits requires satisfying all three prongs: (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues to resolve before a disability determination can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if such evidence were credited. Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593. Even if all three prongs are met, the court retains flexibility in choosing the remedy. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).

Why the Court Declined to Award Benefits Immediately

The Commissioner's concession satisfied the first prong — the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for disregarding Dr. Miller's evidence. However, the court found that the second prong was not satisfied because outstanding factual issues remained.

Outstanding issues exist unless "the record as a whole is free from conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps, . . . all factual issues have been resolved, and . . . the claimant's entitlement to benefits is clear under the applicable legal rules." Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the record contained a genuine factual conflict: The ALJ found Hawthorne could sit for six hours and stand or walk for hours in an eight-hour workday, but Dr. Miller's unaddressed testimony indicated that chronic pain would require Hawthorne to take more frequent breaks than a standard 40-hour workweek permits. This conflict is material to whether Hawthorne could sustain employment.

Moreover, Drs. Packer and Amon both concluded Hawthorne could sit for six hours and stand or walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday — findings that, according to the vocational expert, would permit her to work. This created a direct evidentiary conflict with Dr. Miller's more restrictive assessment that the ALJ must resolve on remand.

Because this factual conflict alone precluded an immediate benefits award, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the ALJ also erred in discounting Hawthorne's own testimony or the opinions of Dr. Myers and Dr. Cohen.

The Agency's Disability Finding for a Later Period

Hawthorne argued that the agency's finding that she was disabled in a closed period immediately following the period at issue here amounted to a concession that she should have been found disabled in this case as well. The court rejected this argument, noting that Hawthorne herself testified her symptoms progressed as she aged, and that the applicable disability rules (POMS DI 25025.035, § 202.01–08) became easier to satisfy as she moved into the next age category.

Disposition

The court remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. No immediate award of benefits was ordered.