Denise M. v. Bisignano
- Dulce Foster
- 0:25-cv-03202
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 18
In Denise M. v. Bisignano, Judge Foster denied plaintiff's challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of disability benefits, finding substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision.
People who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits before March 27, 2017, and whose disability claims have been denied by the agency — particularly those challenging how an ALJ weighed medical expert testimony or assessed subjective pain reports. This decision illustrates the deferential standard courts apply when reviewing such denials and the limitations on using factors like age and body build in setting a residual functional capacity.
What happened
In Denise M. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (No. 25-cv-3202), plaintiff Denise M. sought court review of a December 17, 2024 decision by a Social Security Administration Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. Denise M. alleged disability beginning April 1, 2016, due to conditions including bladder cancer, major depression, anxiety, and degenerative disc disease. After a lengthy administrative history involving two prior ALJ decisions, two remands, and prior federal court litigation in Illinois, the ALJ found that Denise M. retained the ability to perform medium-level work and was therefore not disabled during the relevant period.
Denise M. argued that the ALJ made three errors: (1) improperly discounting the testimony of medical expert Dr. Steven Golub, who on cross-examination agreed she likely could not perform medium work full-time; (2) failing to adequately explain in writing why medium work was appropriate; and (3) failing to compare her reported daily activities against her claimed pain levels. The court examined each argument and found none persuasive. As to Dr. Golub, the court found the ALJ was justified in giving his opinion only partial weight because his testimony was internally inconsistent and his later, more limiting conclusions improperly relied on factors — age and body build — that Social Security rules prohibit an ALJ from using in setting a residual functional capacity (the most a claimant can still do despite her impairments). As to the written explanation, the court found the ALJ's step-four analysis provided a sufficient logical connection between the medical evidence and the medium-work conclusion. As to pain assessment, the court found the ALJ did address the required factors, including daily activities, treatment history, and functional restrictions.
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster denied Denise M.'s request for relief, granted the Commissioner's request for relief, and dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning the case is closed and cannot be refiled. The court's role was limited to asking whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence — a relatively low bar — and the court concluded it was.
The detailed version
- Denise M. v. Bisignano · No. 0:25-cv-03202
- Dulce J. Foster
- Aug. 31, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Denise M. applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act on September 12, 2016, alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2016. She was 54 years old at the time of application and had worked previously as a packer/mover, electronics salesperson, delivery driver, and day porter. Her alleged disabling conditions included bladder cancer, major depression, anxiety, degenerative disc disease, arthritis, and kyphosis (a spinal curvature condition).
The case has a lengthy procedural history. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. An ALJ denied her claim in August 2018 (the "2016 Decision"). The Appeals Council denied further review in June 2019. Denise M. then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Before that court addressed the merits, the parties agreed to remand the case to the agency, which the district court ordered in May 2020. On remand, the ALJ again denied her claim in a "2020 Decision," finding she could perform medium work. The Appeals Council remanded a second time in May 2024, finding the 2020 Decision failed to adequately explain how the evidence supported the medium-work conclusion and directing the ALJ to evaluate the claim through Denise M.'s date last insured of June 30, 2020.
After a November 14, 2024 hearing — at which Denise M., vocational expert, and medical expert Dr. Steven Golub testified — the ALJ issued the "2024 Decision" on December 17, 2024. The ALJ again found Denise M. not disabled for the period from April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2020.
The 2024 ALJ Decision
The ALJ followed the standard five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability under Social Security regulations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)):
- Step 1: Denise M. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. - Step 2: She had several non-severe impairments (including history of bladder cancer without relapse, COPD, GERD, hypertension, and others) and several severe impairments (major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, lumbar and cervical spinal degenerative disc disease). - Step 3: Her impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or medically equal any listing of presumptively disabling impairments. - Step 4 (Residual Functional Capacity, or RFC): The ALJ determined Denise M. could perform medium work, with additional limitations to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks not performed at a fast production rate pace; occasional interactions with co-workers, supervisors, and the public; and occasional changes in work tasks. She was found unable to perform her past relevant work. - Step 5: Based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found she could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy: machine packager (approximately 83,800 jobs), hospital cleaner (approximately 37,200 jobs), and counter attendant (approximately 45,700 jobs). The ALJ therefore found her not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied review of the 2024 Decision, making it the Commissioner's final decision. Denise M. then filed this lawsuit.
Standard of Review
The court's review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to whether the ALJ's decision is supported by "substantial evidence" — meaning relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This threshold is not high. If two inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence and one matches the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm. Remand is warranted only when the ALJ's factual findings are insufficient to permit the court to conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision, or when the ALJ fails to build a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC.
Analysis of Plaintiff's Arguments
1. Evaluation of Medical Expert Dr. Golub's Testimony
Because Denise M.'s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, the applicable framework for evaluating medical opinions is 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), which requires the ALJ to weigh factors including the source's treatment relationship with the claimant, consistency with the record, and area of specialization, and to give "good reasons" for the weight assigned.
Dr. Golub had not treated Denise M. but had reviewed her records. Initially, he testified there was no significant objective support for any severe impairment and no restriction was warranted. On cross-examination, after being asked to account for Denise M.'s pain, age, and weight, he agreed she likely could not perform medium work (defined as being on one's feet 6-8 hours per day, lifting 50 pounds, for 40 hours per week). When the ALJ noted this apparent inconsistency, Dr. Golub said that "a medium level would be a bit out of the realm" given her age, body build, and musculoskeletal issues, but acknowledged the objective evidence could not substantiate her subjective complaints.
The ALJ gave Dr. Golub's opinion only "partial weight," crediting his initial conclusions as consistent with the objective medical evidence but discounting his later, more restrictive conclusions as improperly based on Denise M.'s age and body build. The ALJ cited Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, which expressly provides that "[a]ge and body habitus are not factors in assessing RFC."
The court found the ALJ's approach justified. Internal inconsistency in a medical opinion is a recognized good reason to discount it. See Chesser v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2017). The court also noted that where the testimony is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, the court must defer to the ALJ's interpretation, which was within the "zone of choice" available to the ALJ. Ross v. O'Malley, 92 F.4th 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2024). The court rejected Denise M.'s argument that Dr. Golub was merely contextualizing her degenerative disc disease and not relying on age and weight as independent factors, finding the ALJ's contrary reading was reasonable on the record.
2. Adequacy of Support for the Medium-Work RFC Finding
Denise M. argued the ALJ failed to provide an adequate narrative discussion connecting the evidence to the medium-work finding, as required by SSR 96-8p, and that the RFC was not supported by any valid medical opinion.
The court rejected both arguments. First, it noted that Dr. Golub's initial conclusions — that no restrictions were supported by objective evidence — were credited by the ALJ and support the medium-work finding. Second, the state agency medical consultants had found Denise M. capable of performing her past relevant work, which included medium and heavy exertional levels, and found her physical impairments non-severe. The ALJ actually gave her more benefit of the doubt than the state agency consultants by limiting her to medium (rather than heavy) work and finding some impairments severe. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, an RFC finding need not be supported by any specific medical opinion. Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016).
The court further found that the ALJ's step-four analysis — spanning discussion of Denise M.'s testimony, medical records, imaging, treatment history, and expert opinions — provided an adequate logical bridge to the RFC determination. The court characterized Denise M.'s argument as ultimately a disagreement with how the ALJ weighed the evidence, which is not a basis for reversal when substantial evidence supports the ALJ's choice.
3. Symptom Assessment and Daily Activities
Denise M. argued the ALJ violated SSR 16-3p by failing to compare her reported daily activities against her allegations of disabling pain. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, an ALJ evaluating subjective symptoms must consider the factors articulated in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984): (1) daily activities; (2) duration, frequency, and intensity of the condition; (3) medication dosage, effectiveness, and side effects; (4) precipitating and aggravating factors; and (5) functional restrictions. The ALJ need not discuss each factor explicitly, but must show some consideration of most.
The court found the ALJ did address these factors throughout the decision, including: - Daily activities: Denise M. was independent in activities of daily living, could walk and climb stairs, performed cleaning and laundry, drove and shopped alone. - Treatment effectiveness: Physical therapy produced some symptom improvement, though Denise M. did not follow through with appointments. - Precipitating/aggravating factors: COPD improved after she stopped smoking. - Functional restrictions: The medium-work RFC was specifically assessed to address intermittent muscle spasms and brief periods of acute pain.
The court concluded there was no material deficiency in the ALJ's opinion writing on symptom assessment and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's pain analysis.
Disposition
Judge Foster denied Denise M.'s request for relief (ECF No. 12), granted the Commissioner's request for relief (ECF No. 17), and dismissed the action with prejudice.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.