Carrington v. Anissa De La Cruz

Background

Celeste Simone Carrington is serving a death sentence after a jury convicted him in 1994 of two first-degree murders and other offenses. His federal petition challenging his custody was filed in this case in 2013. The court stayed the case in 2014 so he could return to state court to exhaust claims that had not yet been presented there.

In January 2026, Carrington moved for permission to amend his petition and to keep the stay in place. He sought to add “Claim Thirty-Two,” alleging that the prosecution violated due process by introducing unduly prejudicial evidence and arguments based on sex and gender stereotypes. The proposed claim concerned evidence and arguments about his body size, clothing, interests, movement, sexuality, and gender presentation.

The Proposed Amendment

The respondent argued that the proposed claim was untimely, did not relate back to the original petition, was unexhausted, would be barred by state procedural rules, was delayed because it could have been raised on direct appeal, and was plainly meritless.

The court concluded that whether the proposed claim related back to the original petition was a close question. Reading the original petition broadly, the court found that the proposed claim could share operative facts with existing claims concerning the prosecutor’s evidence and arguments about Carrington’s conduct and characterization as a “thrill killer.” The court therefore assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the proposed claim related back and was timely.

Futility and the State Procedural Bar

The court nevertheless held that amendment would be futile. It concluded that Andrew v. White did not create a new federal rule specifically prohibiting evidence based on gender and sex stereotypes. Instead, the court read Andrew as applying an already established due-process principle: evidence so unfairly prejudicial that it makes a criminal trial fundamentally unfair may violate the Constitution.

The court reasoned that this principle was available when Carrington was tried and pursued his direct appeal. California’s rule generally bars state habeas review of claims that could have been raised on direct appeal. The court determined that the state court would apply that rule to Claim Thirty-Two. Because the state procedural ground was independent of the federal question and adequate to support the state court’s decision, the federal court could not review the claim. The court therefore denied leave to amend.

Stay and Disposition

Because the proposed claim could not be added, the court found no reason to continue the stay that had allowed exhaustion proceedings. The parties agreed that all other claims had been exhausted. The court therefore denied the request to keep the stay in place, removed the existing stay, and directed the parties to prepare and file a joint case-management statement describing the next steps in the litigation within 60 days of the order.

The opinion’s signature identifies the judge’s first name as “RICHARD,” but the remainder of the name is not legible in the provided text; accordingly, this summary refers to the judge as the court.