In re: College Athlete NIL Litigation
- Claudia Wilken
- 4:20-cv-03919
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.
In In re: College Athlete NIL Litigation, Judge Wilken overruled objections from three student-athletes challenging the continuation of a class-action injunctive relief settlement governing college athlete NIL rights.
Division I college athletes who are members of the Injunctive Relief Settlement Class in this ongoing class-action settlement, particularly incoming student-athletes subject to the settlement's roster limits, NIL payment restrictions, and revenue pool caps for the 2026–2027 academic year and beyond.
What happened
In re: College Athlete NIL Litigation (Case No. 20-cv-03919) is a class-action lawsuit involving the rights of college athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL). After the court approved a settlement agreement in June 2025, the settlement required that new members of the affected class — Division I college athletes — receive notice and have the right to object to the settlement's ongoing injunctive terms within 60 days. Three student-athletes filed such objections in 2026, prompting this ruling.
The three objectors raised different concerns. Andres Polanco objected to being included in the case at all, arguing he had never previously competed in Division I athletics. Ruby James Cochrane objected because the settlement limits her ability to seek certain court orders challenging it, and because it restricts benefits like roster spots and NIL payments from certain sources. Gannon Flynn, a swimmer who transferred from the University of Utah to Boston University, objected on multiple grounds, including that the settlement's roster limit rules harmed thousands of athletes, that schools have cut Olympic and women's sports to fund football and basketball, that certain academic awards are no longer being offered, and that the roster limits amount to an illegal agreement under antitrust law. Flynn also asked the court to stop enforcing the roster limit provisions going forward.
Judge Wilken overruled all three objections. As to Polanco, the court explained that members of this type of class (certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)) cannot opt out, so his inclusion is required by law if he competes in Division I sports. As to Cochrane, the court referred to its earlier written explanation approving the settlement and noted that class members retain the right to sue for money damages. As to Flynn, the court found he lacked standing to object because he was already a class member before the settlement was approved and had already objected multiple times — transferring schools did not give him a fresh right to object. The court also addressed each of Flynn's arguments on the merits, finding them unsupported by evidence or legally flawed, and denied his request to stop enforcing the roster limits, finding he had not shown the continued settlement terms were unfair or inequitable. The settlement and its injunctive terms remain in effect for the 2026–2027 academic year.
The detailed version
- In re: College Athlete NIL Litigation · No. 4:20-cv-03919
- Claudia Wilken
- Sept. 3, 2026
Background
This is a class-action lawsuit concerning the rights of Division I college athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL). On June 6, 2025, the court granted final approval of the Fourth Amended Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (SA) and ordered entry of the Second Amended Injunctive Relief Settlement (IRS). The IRS governs ongoing rules applicable to Division I athletic programs, including provisions on revenue pool caps, roster limits, and NIL payments from certain associated entities or individuals.
The SA established a class — certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) — of all student-athletes who compete, competed, or will compete on a Division I athletic team between June 15, 2020, and the end of the IRS term (defined as ten academic years from final approval). The SA required that incoming class members receive notice of the IRS and have the right to object to its continuation within 60 days. Pursuant to court order, notice was sent electronically on June 12, 2026, to athletes joining Division I teams for the first time in the 2026–2027 academic year.
Three student-athletes filed written objections: Andres Polanco (Dkt. No. 1145), Gannon Flynn (Dkt. No. 1149), and Ruby James Cochrane (Dkt. No. 1150). None requested to speak at the hearing previously scheduled for September 25, 2026, so the court resolved the objections on the papers.
Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5), any class member may object to a settlement that requires court approval. The objector bears the burden of proving that the settlement is unreasonable. The court must provide a reasoned response to all non-frivolous objections.
Objector Andres Polanco
Polanco, an incoming freshman at Wagner College, objected to being included in the litigation because he had not previously participated in any NCAA Division I collegiate athletic program. He did not, however, object to the continuation of the IRS itself. Defendants represented that Polanco intends to play Division I baseball during the 2026–2027 academic year.
The court overruled the objection. Because the Injunctive Relief Settlement Class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2) — which governs classes seeking uniform injunctive or declaratory relief — class members have no right to opt out. Citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011), the court noted that Rule 23 provides no opt-out opportunity for (b)(2) class members. To the extent Polanco participates in Division I baseball in 2026–2027, he is automatically a class member.
Objector Ruby James Cochrane
Cochrane, an incoming student-athlete competing for a Division I team for the first time in 2026–2027, raised two objections.
First, she argued the IRS requires her to release her right to seek injunctive and declaratory relief when challenging the IRS. The court overruled this for reasons set forth in its prior opinion supporting final approval of the SA.
Second, she argued the IRS "limits the duration and scope of benefits and protections" for Division I student-athletes, including athletically related benefits, possible roster caps, and restrictions on NIL payments from certain associated entities or individuals. The court interpreted this as challenging the IRS's Pool cap, roster limits, and limits on NIL payments from Associated Entities or Individuals. The court overruled this objection, again referring to its prior analysis and adding that Cochrane and other class members retain the right to sue Defendants for money damages arising from these provisions if they believe they were harmed.
Objector Gannon Flynn
Standing
Flynn was a Division I swimmer at the University of Utah in 2025 and transferred to Boston University for the 2026–2027 academic year. He had previously filed multiple objections to the IRS in January 2025 and April 2025, all of which the court considered before granting final approval.
The court found Flynn lacks standing to object again because he is not an "incoming member" of the Injunctive Relief Settlement Class — he was already a class member before the SA was approved. His transfer to Boston University does not confer a fresh right to object. Nonetheless, the court addressed each of his objections on the merits to explain why they would be overruled even if he had standing.
Objection 1: Harm to Athletes with Designated Student-Athlete (DSA) Status
Flynn argued that thousands of Division I student-athletes with DSA status — a classification under the IRS intended to protect athletes who lost roster spots due to the immediate implementation of roster limits — lost their spots, were forced into the transfer portal, and some could not find a new Division I program or lost scholarships. The court stated it would overrule this objection because Flynn submitted no evidence to support his assertions. Moreover, the court clarified that DSA status was never intended to guarantee a roster spot; it was intended to ensure such athletes would be exempt from roster limits at any Division I school for the remainder of their careers, giving them "the opportunity to be on a roster at the discretion of a Division I school." Schools have always had discretion over roster decisions, and the IRS preserves that discretion. Class members may still sue for damages if harmed by the roster limits provisions.
Objection 2: Flynn's Personal Harm
Flynn argued the University of Utah's implementation of roster limits caused him to lose his roster spot and, indirectly, his athletic scholarship, since Boston University did not offer him an athletic scholarship. The court stated it would overrule this objection for the same reasons: the alleged harms flow from the roster- and resource-allocation decisions of individual schools, not from the IRS being unfair. Flynn retains the right to sue Defendants for any damages he allegedly suffered.
Objection 3: Reduction of Alston Academic Achievement Awards
Flynn argued that many institutions have stopped offering Alston academic achievement awards (a form of academic-performance-based compensation recognized under antitrust precedent). The court stated it would overrule this objection because Flynn provided no supporting evidence, and because Division I institutions have always had discretion whether to offer such awards. The IRS preserving that discretion does not make it unfair or unreasonable.
Objection 4: Cuts to Olympic and Women's Sports
Flynn argued that universities are cutting Olympic and women's sports — or scholarships for those sports — to fund football and basketball programs. The court stated it would overrule this objection because Flynn provided no supporting evidence, and because schools have always had discretion over financial resource allocation among athletic programs.
Objection 5: Antitrust Challenge to Roster Limits
Flynn argued the IRS's roster limits provisions are illegal cartel agreements violating antitrust law. The court stated it would overrule this objection for reasons set forth in its prior opinion supporting final approval of the SA.
Request to Discontinue Enforcement of Roster Limits (Rule 60(b)(5))
Flynn asked the court to stop enforcing the IRS's roster limit provisions going forward, citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order if applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.
The court stated it would deny this request. It found Rufo inapplicable because that standard governs modification of consent decrees relating to constitutional rights, and no such consent decree is at issue here. As to Rule 60(b)(5), the court found Flynn had not shown the IRS is unfair, unreasonable, or that continued enforcement is no longer equitable, and therefore found no basis for modifying or setting aside the final approval order or the final judgment.
Conclusion and Orders
The court overruled all three objections. The SA and IRS remain in effect, without modification, for the 2026–2027 academic year. The court also ordered Plaintiffs to file, no later than June 30, 2027, a proposed notice form and dissemination plan for incoming class members for the 2027–2028 academic year.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.