Doe v. Regents of the University of California

Background

John Doe asked for leave, or permission, to file a motion for reconsideration of parts of the court’s earlier order. That earlier order granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The present order addressed only whether Doe could seek reconsideration; it did not itself reconsider or change the earlier order.

Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party must first obtain permission to file a reconsideration motion. The party must identify a material difference in fact or law that could not reasonably have been known earlier, new material facts or a change in law, or a material fact or decisive legal argument that the court failed to consider.

Equitable tolling

Doe argued that the court should have considered equitable tolling, which can pause a filing deadline when a person pursues a remedy in another forum concerning the same wrong. He pointed to allegations that he had sought relief from the California Civil Rights Division concerning an alleged sexual assault and alleged retaliation.

The court accepted for purposes of the motion that Doe’s claims before that agency concerned the same wrong as the claims in federal court. It also stated that federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 use state law for statute-of-limitations tolling. But the court held that Doe had waived the argument because he did not raise equitable tolling in his opposition to the motion to dismiss or at the hearing. The court declined to develop that legal argument for him based only on allegations that he had contacted the agency.

Degree hold

Doe also argued that the court had failed to consider allegations about refusals in 2024 and 2025 to lift a hold on his degree. The court acknowledged that Doe had referred to those refusals in his opposition brief and that the earlier order had not expressly addressed them.

The court nevertheless denied leave because it concluded that the argument failed on the merits. Doe did not allege that, after his appeal of the student-conduct finding was denied in August 2023, he had a right to another level of appeal. The court reasoned that his later contacts with the Chancellor’s Office did not establish another appeal level and that the August 2023 appeal appeared to be the university’s final decision. The court therefore did not treat the later communications as creating a new timely claim.

Due-process claim and alleged reputational harm

Doe further sought reconsideration of the ruling concerning his due-process claim related to sexual-misconduct proceedings involving Professor Ajoy. The earlier ruling found that Doe lacked a legally recognizable property or liberty interest for two independent reasons. First, the court understood Doe to have admitted that his injury was reputational harm alone, which the court stated was insufficient by itself to support a due-process claim. Second, the court stated that even a combined reputational injury and degree hold would not support a “stigma-plus” theory because the degree was withheld in connection with the student-conduct proceedings, not the alleged computer-sabotage narrative.

In the present order, the court rejected Doe’s contention that his admission was ambiguous or contradicted his earlier arguments. It also stated that, independently, Doe had not sufficiently alleged a causal connection between the alleged false narrative and the degree hold. The court again relied on its conclusion that the student-conduct proceedings were final when the appeal was denied in August 2023.

Disposition

The court denied John Doe’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. It stated that the order disposed of Docket No. 77.