Taylor v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades AFL-CIO

Background

Taylor, a member of Sign, Display & Allied Crafts, Local Union 510, sued the Painters and Allied Trades District Council 36 and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO. He brought one claim under section 101(a)(1) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which gives union members equal rights and privileges to vote in union elections and referendums, subject to reasonable rules.

District Council 36 proposed new bylaws after its Bylaws Committee reviewed and changed them. Among the proposed changes were provisions increasing the District Council 36 Business Manager/Secretary-Treasurer’s salary from 50% to 65% of the General President’s salary and tying certain employee salaries to that position’s salary. On July 17, 2018, the district council mailed members notice of an August 4 referendum, voting locations and hours, and a 43-page copy of the proposed bylaws.

Taylor received the notice, requested a copy of the existing bylaws, received them before the vote, compared the old and proposed bylaws, and spoke with about 50 Local 510 members about opposing the changes. He voted against the amendments. The referendum passed 320-54, with 12 Local 510 members, including Taylor, voting. IUPAT later approved the amended bylaws.

Arguments and legal standard

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material facts show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendants argued that Taylor lacked constitutional standing, had no evidence that District Council 36 discriminated against him, and could not show that IUPAT participated in the challenged referendum process.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Taylor lacked Article III standing. Standing requires an actual or imminent injury, a connection between that injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable decision would remedy the injury. Even assuming the notice and referendum process was wrongful, the court found no injury because Taylor could obtain the old bylaws, compare them with the proposed bylaws, and exercise his right to vote. The court also identified a traceability problem because there was no evidence that members who did not vote would have opposed the amendments at a higher rate than those who voted.

The court further stated that Taylor would lose even if he could establish standing. Taylor conceded that he received the same information at the same time as other members, and the court found no evidence that District Council 36 discriminated against him. The court also found no evidence that IUPAT played a role in setting the referendum’s date and time, selecting voting locations, recruiting election volunteers, deciding how the vote would be conducted, or preparing and distributing the notice. The court noted that IUPAT’s role was to require district councils to create and amend bylaws and approve them before they took effect.

The court also stated that Taylor lacked the necessary basis to assert the rights of other union members because he presented no evidence that those members could not assert their own rights.

Disposition

Judge William Orrick concluded that Taylor’s concerns about the low referendum participation rate were understandable, but that his ability to participate and his concession that he received the same treatment as other members entitled the defendants to summary judgment. The defendants’ motion was granted, and judgment was ordered entered accordingly. The opinion’s conclusion does not separately state a disposition for Taylor’s motion for summary judgment.