Bly v. Commisioner of Social Security Administration
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:18-cv-02450
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In Bly v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Judge Corley granted Bly’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and sent his benefits case back for further proceedings.
Carl Robert Bly’s claim for Supplemental Security Income was sent back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings; the court did not award benefits.
What happened
In Carl Robert Bly v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court reviewed the denial of Bly’s application for Social Security benefits. The administrative law judge found that Bly was not disabled and could perform several jobs, including housekeeper, laundry worker, and garment sorter.
The court found that the administrative law judge failed to properly evaluate Bly’s personality disorder and the combined effect of his impairments. The judge also improperly rejected an examining psychologist’s opinion and did not give specific reasons for rejecting Bly’s statements about his symptoms.
Judge Corley granted Bly’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not award benefits because additional issues remained for the agency to decide.
The detailed version
- Bly v. Commisioner of Social Security Administration · No. 3:18-cv-02450
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Sept. 16, 2019
Background
Carl Robert Bly sought Supplemental Security Income based on several mental and physical impairments, including depression, anxiety, somatic symptom disorder, schizoid personality disorder, gastritis and colitis, carpal tunnel syndrome, a prior left metacarpal fracture, hypertension, hearing loss, and obesity. The Commissioner denied his claim. After an administrative law judge found him not disabled, and the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied review, Bly asked the district court to review the decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The administrative law judge found that Bly had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 21, 2012, had several severe impairments, and could perform medium work with restrictions. The restrictions included occasional repetitive fingering, limited background noise, simple routine tasks performed in a nonpublic setting, and limited interaction with coworkers. The judge found that Bly could not perform his past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Court’s analysis
The court held that the administrative law judge’s evaluation of the medical evidence and Bly’s symptom testimony was not supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support for the conclusion.
First, the administrative law judge did not decide at the second step whether Bly’s personality disorder was a severe impairment. The court found that this particular omission was harmless because the judge identified other severe impairments and continued with the remaining steps. But the administrative law judge still had to consider limitations from the personality disorder when determining Bly’s residual functional capacity, or the most he could still do despite his impairments. The court found that the judge did not do so.
Second, the administrative law judge did not adequately evaluate whether Bly’s impairments, separately or together, met or equaled a listed impairment at Step Three. Bly had identified evidence supporting equivalence to listings for affective, anxiety-related, and personality disorders. The court held that a bare statement that Bly did not meet a listing, without discussing the medical evidence or combined effects of his impairments, was insufficient.
Third, the court held that the administrative law judge did not provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of examining psychologist Dr. Katherine Wiebe while giving substantial weight to the opinions of nonexamining consultants Drs. Davis and Gregg. The court found that the treatment records cited by the administrative law judge did not support the conclusion that Bly had only benign psychiatric findings. The judge also improperly relied on Bly’s daily activities and overstated the evidence of work activity. In addition, the judge did not adequately account for the fact that Dr. Wiebe’s later opinion was based on a more recent evaluation than the consultants’ opinions.
Fourth, the court rejected the administrative law judge’s evaluation of Bly’s symptom testimony. The judge used general language stating that Bly’s statements were inconsistent with the evidence but did not identify which statements were rejected or explain what evidence contradicted them. Because the judge did not find that Bly was malingering, the court required specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony and found that requirement unmet.
The court did not decide Bly’s additional arguments about the residual functional capacity finding or the administrative law judge’s failure to obtain testimony from a medical expert. Because the errors concerning the medical evidence and symptom testimony affected the core disability determination, the court found them not harmless.
Disposition
Bly asked the court either to order payment of benefits or to remand for further proceedings. The court chose further proceedings because the record was not fully developed and unresolved issues remained concerning the personality disorder, the Step Three listing analysis, Dr. Wiebe’s opinions—particularly her 2016 opinion—and the symptom-testimony finding.
Judge Corley granted Bly’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the order. The court did not order an award of benefits.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.