Cropsey v. Social Security
- Donna Ryu
- 4:18-cv-02838
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 18
In Cropsey v. Social Security, Judge Ryu granted Cropsey’s motion in part, denied it in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Mark O. Cropsey and the Commissioner of Social Security. The decision required further proceedings on whether the Appeals Council should consider two additional medical opinions in evaluating Cropsey’s disability-benefits claim.
What happened
In Cropsey v. Social Security, Mark O. Cropsey challenged the denial of his application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. An administrative law judge found that Cropsey had serious mental impairments but could perform simple work, including his past work as a dishwasher and other jobs.
Cropsey argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated medical opinions, rejected his testimony, applied the wrong disability standard, found he could perform other work, and that the Appeals Council failed to consider new evidence. The court rejected his challenges to the medical-opinion evaluation, credibility assessment, and finding about other work. But it ruled that the Appeals Council should have considered later opinions from Dr. Jean Marsters and Gardner Fair because they relied on treatment from before the administrative law judge’s decision.
Judge Ryu granted Cropsey’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The remand was for consideration of the two additional opinions; the court did not order an award of benefits.
The detailed version
- Cropsey v. Social Security · No. 4:18-cv-02838
- Donna Ryu
- Sept. 23, 2019
Background
Mark O. Cropsey applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, alleging that he became unable to work on April 8, 2014. The Social Security Administration denied the application initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge David LaBarre found Cropsey not disabled. The administrative law judge found severe impairments including major neurocognitive disorder related to traumatic brain injury and substance abuse, and an affective disorder involving major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder.
The administrative law judge found that Cropsey could perform work at all physical exertional levels, subject to limits involving simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; simple work-related decisions; routine workplace changes; limited interaction with the public and coworkers; and verbal or demonstrated instructions from a supervisor. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge found that Cropsey could perform his past work as a dishwasher and other jobs, including hand packager, linen-room attendant, and janitor. The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.
Issues and analysis
Cropsey challenged the decision on several grounds: the evaluation of medical opinions, the assessment of his testimony about his symptoms, the alleged use of a “total disability” standard, the finding that he could perform other work, and the Appeals Council’s refusal to consider additional evidence.
The court held that Cropsey had not shown error in the treatment of the opinions from Dr. Katherine Wiebe and Dr. Rachyll Dempsey. The administrative law judge gave those opinions partial weight because they were inconsistent with the record as a whole and, as to Dr. Dempsey, lacked supporting explanation. The court found those reasons sufficiently specific and supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the administrative law judge’s failure to discuss a report by Drs. Jeffrey Kahn and Svetlana Medvinsky was harmless because the report did not otherwise address Cropsey’s work capacity.
The court rejected Cropsey’s challenge to the assessment of his testimony. Because the record did not show that Cropsey was exaggerating or fabricating his symptoms, the administrative law judge had to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting the testimony. The court concluded that the administrative law judge did so by discussing the objective findings, Cropsey’s ability to perform daily activities, his prior work, his average-range IQ, and the medical evidence. The court also found no error in the step-five finding about other work because the administrative law judge had not relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, contrary to Cropsey’s argument. The court declined to consider Cropsey’s undeveloped argument that the administrative law judge applied a “total disability” standard.
The court reached a different conclusion regarding evidence submitted to the Appeals Council. The additional evidence included an assessment from Gardner Fair, a marriage and family therapist, and a mental-impairment questionnaire from Dr. Jean Marsters. The Appeals Council declined to consider the evidence because it said the evidence did not relate to the period at issue. The court explained that later medical evaluations can relate to the earlier period when they are based on treatment provided before the administrative law judge’s decision. Because both providers described treatment that occurred before the November 24, 2017 decision, the court ruled that the Appeals Council should have considered the opinions.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part Cropsey’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The remand required consideration of the opinions from Dr. Marsters and MFT Fair. The opinion did not award benefits or state that Cropsey was disabled. The court’s order was signed by Judge Donna M. Ryu.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.