Herrick v. Berryhill

Background

Kathryn S. Herrick applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits. The administrative law judge found that she had severe affective, personality, bipolar, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity impairments. The judge determined that Herrick retained the capacity to perform work at all physical exertional levels, subject to limits requiring simple, routine, repetitive work; a low-stress setting; no interaction with the general public; and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. Relying on vocational-expert testimony, the judge found that Herrick could perform jobs such as motor vehicle assembler and cleaner/housekeeper and therefore was not disabled.

Herrick sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She moved for summary judgment seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s decision. The Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment seeking affirmance.

Issues and governing standards

The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge’s findings were based on legal error or were unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means evidence that could lead a reasonable person to accept the conclusion, even though it is less than a preponderance of the evidence. The court could not replace the Commissioner’s judgment when the evidence reasonably supported two conclusions.

Herrick argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated the opinions of examining psychologist Katherine Wiebe, psychotherapist Matilda St. John, and treating psychiatric nurse practitioner Brian Whiteside and physician Michael Hipolito. The opinion’s discussion focused on Wiebe, St. John, and Hipolito.

Dr. Wiebe’s opinion

Dr. Wiebe conducted a consultative psychological examination and assessed moderate to severe limitations in daily activities and social functioning, marked limitations in maintaining attention and concentration for two-hour periods and completing a normal workday and workweek, and vulnerability to deterioration under regular workplace stress.

The administrative law judge considered Wiebe’s opinion less persuasive for several reasons, including that Wiebe had been retained for the appeal, that the opinion lacked support from other evidence, that its conclusions appeared more restrictive than Wiebe’s test findings, and that treatment records showed improvement after Herrick’s December 2013 hospitalization.

The court held that the fact that Herrick retained Wiebe did not by itself provide a legally sufficient reason to reject the opinion. The court also found the statement that the opinion lacked support too broad and unexplained. But the court concluded that the administrative law judge gave two sufficient reasons: Wiebe’s restrictive functional conclusions conflicted with her generally stronger test results, and treatment records through October 2014 largely documented improvement and mostly normal mental-status examinations. The court therefore found no error in assigning Wiebe’s opinion less weight.

Ms. St. John’s opinion

St. John, who had treated Herrick weekly since February 2012, described profound problems with focus, task completion, mood instability, and panic. She assessed extreme or marked limitations in several areas, stated that Herrick would miss more than four workdays each month, and said she could not imagine a work setting that could reasonably accommodate Herrick.

Because St. John was treated as an “other source” rather than an acceptable medical source under the applicable regulations, the administrative law judge needed reasons germane to St. John to discount her opinion. The court found sufficient reasons concerning concentration, persistence, pace, and daily activities. Objective testing showed only mild impairment in concentration, and treatment records and other evidence showed that Herrick could attend to personal hygiene, drive, shop, make appointments, and feed herself.

The court found insufficient reasons for discounting St. John’s opinion about social functioning. Living with roommates did not show that Herrick had meaningful social interaction, and the administrative law judge incorrectly stated that Herrick attended philosophy conferences after her alleged disability onset date. The court nevertheless found the error harmless because the residual functional capacity already restricted Herrick to no public interaction and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.

Dr. Hipolito’s opinion

Dr. Hipolito assessed marked limitations in Herrick’s daily activities, social functioning, and concentration, persistence, or pace, and opined that her impairments would likely cause her to miss more than four workdays per month.

The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject the opinions about daily activities and concentration, persistence, and pace. Those opinions were inconsistent with Herrick’s objective test scores and generally unremarkable mental-status examinations. The court found the reason given for discounting the social-functioning opinion insufficient, but again held that the error was harmless because the residual functional capacity adequately reflected Herrick’s documented social limitations.

Disposition

The court held that the administrative law judge did not err in weighing the medical evidence. It denied Herrick’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment against Herrick and close the file.