Chavez v. Berryhill

Background

Gloria Chavez applied for Social Security disability benefits under both Title II and Title XVI in January 2015. She alleged that she had been unable to work since February 1, 2014 because of physical and mental impairments, including back problems, knee problems, chronic pain, posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and substance-use conditions. The applications and a later request for reconsideration were denied. After a May 2017 hearing, an administrative law judge denied the applications, and the Appeals Council denied further review.

The administrative law judge found that Chavez had several severe impairments but that none met or equaled the severity of an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations. The judge determined that Chavez retained the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform light work with limits on lifting, climbing, postural activities, and exposure to extreme cold and wetness. The judge also found that Chavez could perform some of her past work and other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Issues Raised

Chavez challenged the administrative law judge’s decision on two principal grounds. First, she argued that the judge did not give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony about the severity and frequency of her symptoms and the effects of treatment. Second, she argued that the judge failed to provide a sufficient reason for rejecting or failing to properly credit testimony from her live-in partner, Mark Kolber, and her daughter, Jacqueline Chavez.

Chavez also argued that the administrative law judge should have developed the record further by obtaining additional mental-health records. The court concluded that this argument had been waived because Chavez was represented at the administrative hearing and, when asked whether the record was complete, responded that it was.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Chavez’s testimony about her pain and functional limitations. The judge relied on treatment records, examination findings, observations, reported daily activities, the relatively conservative and noninvasive nature of much of the treatment, and inconsistencies concerning the reason Chavez stopped working. The court held that the judge did not rely solely on a lack of objective medical evidence.

The court agreed with Chavez that the administrative law judge could not rely on cited substance-use records to discredit her testimony because those records did not clearly establish that her earlier statement about her substance use was untrue when made. The court nevertheless concluded that the remaining reasons supported the symptom evaluation. Those reasons included evidence that Chavez performed household chores, cared for her significant other, used public transportation, went out and shopped, did computer work, and had generally intact functioning during examinations.

The court also rejected Chavez’s challenge to the treatment of the third-party statements. Kolber’s testimony described limitations that tracked Chavez’s own testimony, and the daughter’s report likewise did not allege greater limitations. Because the administrative law judge had given legally sufficient reasons for discounting Chavez’s testimony, any error in failing to discuss or give more weight to the third-party statements was harmless.

Disposition

The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free of reversible legal error. It denied Chavez’s motion for summary judgment and granted Nancy A. Berryhill’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 18 and 19.