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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 27, 2019

B. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District

Judge
Yvonne Rogers
Docket
3:19-cv-02394
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
5
Motion to DismissCivil RightsSection 1983ADA / Disability
In one sentence

In Brennon B. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District, Judge Rogers granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.

Who this affects

The ruling affected Brennon B.’s claims against the school district and its officials, including Principal Robert Evans. Claims based on alleged sexual touching by Mr. King were dismissed under Section 1983 and Title IX, while claims based on alleged conduct by other students and the ADA and Section 504 disability claims were allowed to continue.

What happened

In Brennon B. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District, the plaintiff alleged that other students sexually touched him at school and that school officials failed to investigate or protect him, in part because of his disability. The defendants argued that several claims were too late and that the allegations were legally insufficient.

The court ruled that the filing deadlines for the plaintiff’s claims under the civil-rights law, Section 504, and Title IX were still paused because of the plaintiff’s incompetence. It allowed the disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 to continue. It also allowed the civil-rights and Title IX claims concerning other students’ conduct to continue, but granted dismissal of the civil-rights and Title IX claims based on alleged conduct by Mr. King. The plaintiff had separately agreed to dismiss his civil-rights claim against the school district.

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, ending only the portions of the civil-rights and Title IX claims tied to Mr. King’s alleged conduct.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
B. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District · No. 3:19-cv-02394
Judge
Yvonne Rogers
Date
Sept. 27, 2019

Background

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. The claims arose from allegations that other students sexually touched the plaintiff while he was unsupervised by district staff, and that school officials failed to investigate reports of the conduct or take meaningful corrective action. The plaintiff also alleged that school officials relied on his disability-related communication difficulties to discredit his reports.

The plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title IX. The plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of his Section 1983 claim against West Contra Costa Unified School District. The order addressed the remaining portions of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Rulings

Timeliness. The defendants argued that the Section 1983, Section 504, and Title IX claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court found that the limitations periods had been and continued to be tolled because of the plaintiff’s incompetence. It therefore denied this portion of the defendants’ motion.

Section 1983 claim against Principal Robert Evans. A claim under Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and, for the equal-protection theory at issue, discrimination against an identifiable class that was intentional or deliberately indifferent. The parties did not dispute that Evans acted under color of state law. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s alleged disability could qualify as an identifiable class and that the allegations about reports of sexual touching by other students, Evans’s failure to investigate, and the alleged reliance on the plaintiff’s communication difficulties were sufficient at the pleading stage. The court denied the motion as to the Section 1983 claim based on harm from sexual touching by other students.

The court granted the motion as to the Section 1983 claim based on harm from sexual touching by Mr. King because the plaintiff had not alleged that Evans or another district employee knew of, or suspected, inappropriate sexual touching by Mr. King. The court noted that the plaintiff could request permission to amend if discovery produced evidence of that knowledge or suspicion.

Americans with Disabilities Act claim. The court ruled that Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar the plaintiff’s Title II claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties did not dispute that the plaintiff alleged he was a qualified individual with a disability. The court found that the allegations that the district failed to investigate or respond to reported abuse, and treated the plaintiff’s disability-related communication difficulties as a reason to discredit his reports, were sufficient to allege disability-based discrimination and deliberate indifference. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA claim.

Section 504 claim. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments concerning the Section 504 claim for the same factual reasons supporting the ADA ruling. The order states that the two claims require the same factual bases.

Title IX claim. The court explained that a school may face a Title IX claim based on sexual harassment by another student when the harassment is sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to deny access to an educational opportunity, and an appropriate school official has actual knowledge but responds with deliberate indifference. The court found that the plaintiff had alleged actual knowledge of sexual contact by fellow special-needs students. It granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title IX claim to the extent it was based on conduct by Mr. King and denied in part the motion to the extent the claim was based on conduct by other students.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order terminated Docket Number 23. It did not state that any dismissed claim was dismissed with or without prejudice.

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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