Lacy v. Berryhill

Background

Gayle Amanda Lacy had previously been found disabled as of October 17, 2006, based on limitations related to post-traumatic stress disorder and borderline intellectual functioning. The Social Security Administration later conducted a continuing disability review and concluded that her disability had ended because of medical improvement. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge E. Alis found that Lacy was no longer disabled as of May 31, 2015. The Appeals Council declined review, and Lacy sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Lacy’s medical records included depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, knee and foot pain, peripheral neuropathy, nausea, headaches, and heart-related conditions. Her treating providers gave opinions that she would have serious mental and physical work limitations, including difficulty maintaining concentration, a need for breaks to elevate her leg, and approximately three absences per month. Other examining and non-examining professionals offered different assessments.

Parties’ Arguments

Lacy moved for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly rejected opinions from treating psychiatrist Dr. Armeen Weber; treating psychiatrist Dr. Michael Hipolito; treating psychologist Dr. Elizabeth Pearce and trainee Suada Molla; and treating physician Dr. Narra. She also argued that the judge improperly evaluated her testimony, failed to find nausea was a severe impairment, incorrectly found medical improvement, and relied on an unsupported residual functional capacity and vocational-expert testimony.

The Commissioner argued that any error concerning nausea was harmless and that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s findings.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide the legally required reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Weber’s opinion. The judge did not show that he considered required factors such as Weber’s treatment relationship with Lacy, the nature and extent of that treatment, consistency, and specialization. The court also found that the judge relied on Lacy’s social activities and household activities without considering the limitations and context she described. Those activities did not provide adequate reasons for rejecting Weber’s opinions about limited social contact and likely absences from work.

The court likewise held that the reasons given for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Pearce and Molla were not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that examining psychologist Dr. Keiko Miller reached similar conclusions in some areas, and that Pearce and Molla’s mental-status observations included poor insight, slow speech, withdrawal, isolation, and avoidance of others. The administrative law judge also improperly addressed only some of Miller’s assessed limitations rather than evaluating the opinion as a whole.

The court found that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Dr. Narra’s opinions about Lacy’s need to elevate her leg, take unscheduled breaks, and miss work. The judge relied on a normal vascular ultrasound without medical evidence explaining why that result conflicted with the need to elevate the leg, and did not address abnormal nerve-test results. The court also rejected reliance on Lacy’s household and other activities as an adequate reason to discount Narra’s opinion.

The court further found errors in evaluating Lacy’s symptom testimony. The administrative law judge did not adequately establish that Lacy failed to take her medication as prescribed, did not investigate the circumstances, and relied on the absence of psychiatric hospitalization even though hospitalization was not required for disability based on depression. The judge also failed to clearly identify which statements about Lacy’s knee and foot pain were being rejected and why. The court concluded that these errors independently warranted reversal and therefore did not decide Lacy’s remaining arguments.

Remedy and Disposition

The court applied the rule allowing improperly rejected evidence to be treated as true when the administrative law judge gave legally insufficient reasons, no unresolved issues remained, and the record showed disability without serious doubt. It found that further proceedings would not be useful because the record exceeded 1,100 pages and included extensive treatment and evaluation evidence. The vocational expert testified that work would not be available for a person who needed to elevate a leg to waist level, would be off task about 30 percent of the workday, or would miss three or more days per month. The court found that any one of those limitations, if credited, supported disability.

The court GRANTED Lacy’s motion for summary judgment, DENIED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and REMANDED the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for immediate payment of benefits.