Walters v. County of Contra Costa

Background

Walter L. Walters, an African American anesthesiologist, alleged that a temporary staffing agency assigned him to Contra Costa Regional Medical Center, a public hospital owned and operated by Contra Costa County. He said he had accepted the assignment on the condition that he work eight-hour weekday shifts because of recent illness, inflammatory bowel disease, psoriasis, ankle problems, and exhaustion. Instead, he was scheduled for longer shifts.

Walters alleged that, during his final shift, Medical Director Felicia I. Tornabene suspected that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol because his speech sounded slurred and he appeared to have difficulty walking. He said he explained that his speech and walking were affected by a partial denture and ankle problems, and repeatedly requested a drug, alcohol, or sobriety test. According to the complaint, Tornabene refused testing and asked Sheriff’s deputies Brian Cain and Angela D. Prasad to remove him, prevent him from driving, and put him in a taxi. Walters alleged that Cain later twisted his wrist and arm and pulled him from his car after he started it to look for his keys. He also alleged racial animus and retaliation by hospital personnel.

The complaint asserted five categories of claims: civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They sought dismissal of all claims against Tornabene and Prasad, all Fourteenth Amendment claims, and the Fourth Amendment claim concerning Walters’s removal from the hospital.

Fourteenth Amendment claims

Walters clarified that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims relied on the same alleged conduct: forcing him to leave the hospital, forcing him to take a taxi, and Cain’s use of force. The court held that unreasonable seizures and excessive force must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment when that specific constitutional provision covers the alleged conduct. It therefore dismissed Walters’s Fourteenth Amendment claims with prejudice.

Fourth Amendment claims

The court dismissed, with leave to amend, the Fourth Amendment claim based on forcing Walters to leave the hospital. The court did not decide whether ordering him to leave, without physical force, constituted a seizure. Instead, it held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages when the law did not clearly establish that their particular conduct violated the Constitution. The court concluded that no published Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision had clearly established that ordering someone to leave a hospital, without physical force, was a Fourth Amendment seizure.

The court denied dismissal of Walters’s Fourth Amendment claim based on forcing him to take a taxi and preventing him from driving his own car. Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the court held that Walters had alleged a seizure because the defendants restrained his freedom of movement through physical force or official authority. The court also concluded that Walters had stated a limited claim that the seizure was unreasonable because the defendants allegedly refused his repeated requests for testing and did not independently investigate whether he was impaired. The court denied qualified immunity on this claim without prejudice to the defendants renewing that defense at summary judgment.

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against Tornabene and Prasad. It found that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Tornabene meaningfully participated in, directed, or encouraged Cain’s later use of force at the car. It also found no allegations that Prasad knew Walters and Cain would go to the car, knew Walters would start it, or knew Cain would use force. The defendants did not challenge the excessive-force claim against Cain.

State-law claims against Prasad

The court dismissed, with leave to amend, the assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims against Prasad. The complaint did not allege that Prasad threatened or touched Walters, that her own conduct was outrageous or caused his emotional distress, or that she owed and breached a legal duty that caused his injury. The court also rejected the theories that Prasad could be liable for Cain’s conduct merely because she supervised him, directed him to follow Tornabene’s instructions, or allegedly failed to train him, because the complaint did not connect those alleged actions to Cain’s later use of force.

Disposition

Judge Ryu ordered that the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed with prejudice. The Fourth Amendment claim concerning forced removal from the hospital, the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims against Tornabene and Prasad, and the four state-law claims against Prasad were dismissed with leave to amend. The order permitted Walters to file an amended complaint by November 12, 2019, and granted him leave to add a defamation claim. The order also states that Walters was then proceeding without a lawyer after his counsel received permission to withdraw.