McGee v. The City of Hercules

Background

Anthony McGee alleged that he entered Hercules City Hall on or about September 15, 2023, and spoke with Hercules Police Department commanding officer Dwayne Collard. According to the complaint, Collard told McGee that he was not complying with California’s sex-offender registration law. McGee alleged that he did not have a conviction requiring registration and gave the officer reasons why he believed he was not required to register.

McGee alleged that at least two officers told him he was under arrest for failing to register. He was restrained, taken to Contra Costa County Jail, and booked for that offense. He later posted bail and returned to the Hercules Police Department, where he signed a registration form. He alleged that he registered because of coercion and fear for his liberty and freedom from unwanted attention and harassment.

McGee sued the City of Hercules and the Hercules Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows people to seek relief for violations of federal constitutional rights by state or local officials. Although McGee did not clearly identify his legal claim, the court construed the complaint as alleging an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The complaint sought six hundred million dollars in damages.

Requests for Judicial Notice and Other Materials

The defendants asked the court to take judicial notice, meaning accept certain facts from public or otherwise reliable records without requiring proof, of an order in a related criminal proceeding and a signed sex-offender registration form. The court took notice of the criminal-court order because it was a public record not subject to reasonable dispute. The court declined to take judicial notice of the registration form because its contents, including McGee’s allegation that he signed it under coercion, were reasonably disputed. However, because the complaint referred to the form and McGee did not dispute its authenticity, the court considered it as a document incorporated into the complaint.

McGee asked the court to take judicial notice of his involvement in several other cases and of materials from a related criminal case. The court took notice that McGee was a party to the listed cases but declined to take notice of all records filed in them. It also denied his request concerning exhibits from a July 26, 2024 evidentiary hearing because the court could not determine whether judicial notice of those exhibits was proper. The court did not consider exhibits attached to McGee’s opposition because they had not been sufficiently authenticated.

Rule 12(c) Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) tests whether the complaint legally states a claim, based on the pleadings and materials properly considered with them. The court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The court generally cannot consider outside evidence unless it is incorporated into the complaint or is subject to judicial notice. If outside materials are considered, the motion ordinarily must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Fourth Amendment Unlawful-Arrest Claim

An arrest claim under § 1983 may proceed when an arrest allegedly violated the Fourth Amendment because it lacked probable cause or another legal justification. Probable cause means knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the person arrested committed an offense. It is an objective standard, and it does not require conclusive proof of guilt. Mere suspicion is not enough.

The defendants argued that they had probable cause to arrest McGee for failing to register because Hercules officers had searched the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System criminal database and relied on information in that database. The court recognized that reasonable reliance on a reliable database could, in theory, establish probable cause. But the defendants’ declaration describing the databases and sources used before the arrest was not part of the pleadings, was not incorporated into McGee’s complaint, and was not subject to judicial notice. The court therefore did not consider it and declined to convert the motion into a summary-judgment motion.

The pleadings and properly considered materials did not identify the sources on which the defendants relied or address the reliability of those sources. The court therefore could not determine on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that reliance on a criminal database supplied probable cause.

The defendants also argued that McGee was required to register under California’s sex-offender registration law. The court concluded that an earlier order in the related criminal proceeding established that McGee was required to register at the time of the September 2023 arrest. But the court explained that the existence of information establishing a registration obligation was not enough by itself. The officers had to have known, or reasonably relied on, trustworthy information providing probable cause when they arrested McGee. Nothing in the criminal-court order, the pleadings, or incorporated documents showed that the defendants knew about that order when the arrest occurred. The court therefore declined to find that the order established probable cause.

The court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest claim, without prejudice to the defendants bringing a motion for summary judgment.

Fifth Amendment Due-Process Argument

The defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment on any Fifth Amendment due-process claim because the officers were local rather than federal law-enforcement officers. The court did not interpret the complaint as asserting a Fifth Amendment claim. Because McGee had not alleged a Fifth Amendment violation, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss any such claim.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability for damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The defendants argued that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that the arrest conduct violated the Constitution.

The court rejected that argument at this stage because it assumed that the defendants had already shown the arrest was lawful. Since the court declined to grant judgment on the pleadings on the unlawful-arrest claim, the qualified-immunity argument did not support judgment for the defendants.

Disposition

Judge Thomas S. Hixson denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The order did not decide that McGee ultimately will prevail on the unlawful-arrest claim; it held that the defendants were not entitled to judgment based on the pleadings and materials properly considered at this stage.