Rabieh-v-United States of America,et.al

Background

Raad Zuhair Rabieh alleged that he was assaulted at the Robert F. Peckham Federal Building in San Jose, California, on April 12, 2016. He had gone to a Social Security Administration office. After his appointment, he accidentally activated an alarm while leaving through an emergency-exit door. A Paragon Systems, Inc. security guard asked him to wait and took his driver’s license. After Rabieh questioned the delay and tried to obtain a supervisor’s phone number, another guard allegedly threatened to arrest him, twisted and pinned his arm, handcuffed him, and—along with another guard—slammed him into a wall and the floor. Rabieh alleged that he did not threaten or resist the guards and suffered cuts, bruises, and disorientation.

Paragon was a private corporation providing security screening and day-to-day security services under a contract with the Federal Protective Service (FPS). The FPS oversaw the contract but did not manage the guards’ day-to-day activities. Paragon handled most guard training, supervision, management, equipment, and discipline. The guards were not federal law-enforcement officers and were not authorized by law to make arrests, conduct searches, or seize evidence. They could conduct administrative inspections and detain people in certain circumstances, but they were instructed to contact FPS or local law enforcement for an authorized search or arrest.

Rabieh’s amended complaint asserted five causes of action: negligence and premises liability; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; assault and battery; false imprisonment and false arrest; and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He sued the United States, the Department of Homeland Security, the FPS, and unknown FPS officers.

Rule 12(b)(1) and the Federal Tort Claims Act

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which allows a court to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that it could consider evidence outside the complaint and resolve factual disputes because the relevant Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) exceptions presented threshold jurisdictional questions separate from the underlying conduct.

The FTCA generally waives the United States’ immunity from certain tort suits, but the waiver is limited. The court considered three exceptions: the intentional-tort exception, the independent-contractor exception, and the discretionary-function exception.

Intentional-tort claims

The court dismissed Rabieh’s assault-and-battery and false-imprisonment-and-false-arrest claims. Under the FTCA, those intentional torts may be pursued only when the alleged tortfeasor is a federal investigative or law-enforcement officer empowered by law to conduct searches, seize evidence, or make arrests for federal-law violations.

The court found that the Paragon guards were private security guards, not federal officers, and were not empowered by federal law to search, seize, or arrest. The fact that they worked at a federal building and contacted the FPS did not make them federal law-enforcement officers. The intentional-tort exception therefore applied, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted as to claims three and four.

Negligence and premises-liability claim

The court also granted the motion to dismiss claim one. The FTCA’s independent-contractor exception generally prevents the United States from being held vicariously liable for the acts of an independent contractor. The United States could still be directly liable for its own breach of a nondelegable duty, but Rabieh had not shown either that the FPS substantially supervised the guards’ day-to-day work or that the United States had such a duty.

The court rejected Rabieh’s arguments that the FPS’s instruction to contact it after an alarm, references to an FPS officer as a supervisor, and a Government Accountability Office report demonstrated the required level of supervision. The evidence instead showed that Paragon managed and supervised the guards, while the FPS primarily set contract requirements and checked compliance.

The court also found that Rabieh had not shown that using security guards was an inherently dangerous activity or that the defendants failed to take reasonable steps to secure the building. The court separately agreed that security decisions involving the level of security measures were protected by the discretionary-function exception. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was therefore granted as to claim one.

Negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss claim two under the discretionary-function exception. The FPS had discretion in setting and enforcing security policies and in deciding the extent of hiring, training, and supervision. The court concluded that these decisions involved judgments based on social, economic, and political policy, which the exception protects from suit under the FTCA.

Other defendants and emotional-distress claim

The court stated that the United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action. It therefore dismissed the claims against the FPS, the Department of Homeland Security, and the unknown FPS officers.

The court also stated that California law, as applied in an FTCA case, does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate tort from negligence. Because Rabieh’s fifth claim duplicated his negligence claim, the court dismissed that claim with prejudice.

Discovery and disposition

Rabieh requested limited jurisdiction-related discovery, but he did not explain what evidence he sought or why discovery was reasonably likely to undermine the defendants’ jurisdictional arguments. The court denied that request.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It allowed Rabieh to file an amended complaint regarding the other claims, but not the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, which was dismissed with prejudice. Any amended complaint had to be filed by December 2, 2019.