Raquel Chavez v. WYNAR

Background

Life Savers Concepts Association, Inc. assisted low-income homeowners facing foreclosure. The plaintiffs were alleged to be Life Savers employees. On July 11, 2017, Wynar and other FBI agents executed a search warrant at Life Savers’ Sunnyvale offices. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs lived in adjoining office quarters; that agents entered with guns drawn; that Rito and Esequiel were handcuffed; that the plaintiffs were prevented from leaving and from using phones; and that some plaintiffs were questioned after the search ended.

Claims and legal standard

The second amended complaint asserted Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims under Bivens, a damages remedy against certain federal officers for constitutional violations. Wynar moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. He argued that qualified immunity protected him from the Fourth Amendment claims and that the Fifth Amendment claims should be dismissed. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials unless the alleged facts show a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Fourth Amendment claims by Rito and Esequiel

The court granted the motion to dismiss to the extent the claims were based on handcuffing Rito and Esequiel during the warrant-related detention as excessive force. The court concluded that the complaint did not allege a violation of clearly established law, noting that the alleged handcuffing lasted over 30 minutes, was shorter than the detention approved in a cited Supreme Court case, and lacked allegations that the handcuffs were improperly or excessively tight, caused physical injury, or that the plaintiffs complained about them. Because the plaintiffs had not cured deficiencies identified in the prior order, the court denied leave to amend, and the final order states that this portion was granted with prejudice.

The court denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss the claim that Wynar pointed a gun at Rito and Esequiel after they were handcuffed. Accepting the complaint’s allegations for purposes of the motion, the court found that pointing a gun at compliant, handcuffed, apparently unarmed people could violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. The court said the qualified-immunity issue was premature because the factual record had not been developed.

The court also denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss the claim that prolonged questioning of Rito and Esequiel after the search unreasonably extended their detention. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that the plaintiffs remained detained, could not use phones, and were questioned before being allowed to leave after the search had ended. The court found that these allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage under Ninth Circuit precedent, while noting that the ruling did not determine whether qualified immunity would ultimately apply.

Fourth Amendment claims by Lupita

The court granted the motion to dismiss to the extent Lupita’s claim relied on temporarily denying her access to shoes and clothing. The complaint alleged that she initially emerged not completely dressed and barefoot, was told to wait before returning to dress, and was later accompanied by a male agent while dressing. The court concluded that these allegations did not establish a violation of clearly established law during the warrant-related detention. The court denied leave to amend, and the final order states that this portion was granted with prejudice.

The court denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss Lupita’s claim concerning denial of cell-phone access after the search ended. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that the restriction was not carefully limited to its justification, particularly because the timing of searches at other locations was unclear and the alleged justification may have ended. The court said the qualified-immunity question could be addressed later after development of the factual record.

Fifth Amendment claims and disposition

The plaintiffs did not respond to Wynar’s arguments about their Fifth Amendment claims in their opposition. The court treated that failure as abandonment and granted the motion to dismiss those claims with prejudice. The court also stated that the claims appeared to rely on a theory involving self-incrimination or Miranda violations, that the plaintiffs had not cited authority supporting such a Bivens claim, and that amendment would be futile.

Judge Lucy H. Koh therefore granted in part and denied in part Wynar’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The order granted the motion with prejudice as to the Fifth Amendment claims, the handcuffing theory asserted by Rito and Esequiel, and Lupita’s shoes-and-clothing theory. It denied the motion without prejudice as to the gun-pointing theory involving Rito and Esequiel, their prolonged-questioning theory, and Lupita’s cell-phone-access theory.