Banks-Reed v. Bay Area Rapid Transit

Background

On January 3, 2018, BART police officer Joseph Mateu III responded to reports of gunfire at the West Oakland BART Station. He encountered Sahleem Tindle and Rayvell Newton physically struggling over a gun. Mateu repeatedly ordered both men to show their hands. Tindle raised his empty left hand immediately before Mateu fired three shots, killing him.

The parties gave different accounts of the incident. Defendants said Tindle possessed the gun, failed to surrender, and turned toward Newton while holding the gun in his right hand. Plaintiffs said Newton was controlling Tindle’s hands during a struggle over the gun and that Tindle raised his free left hand in an attempt to surrender. Body-camera footage confirmed some events but did not clearly show the positions of the men’s hands or the gun when Mateu arrived.

Claims and Summary-Judgment Rulings

Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a California Civil Code section 52.1 claim under the Bane Act, and state-law wrongful-death negligence claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine dispute requiring a trial.

Fourth Amendment excessive force and qualified immunity. The court denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claim. It identified factual disputes about whether Tindle possessed the gun when Mateu arrived and whether Tindle was attempting to surrender when Mateu shot him. Those disputes affected the most important excessive-force consideration: whether Tindle posed an immediate threat. The court also found a dispute about whether Tindle was actively resisting or evading arrest. Because those factual questions prevented a ruling that Mateu’s conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law, the court denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

The court also denied summary judgment on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from civil damages when the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court concluded that the disputed facts about gun possession and surrender made it inappropriate to decide qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Fourteenth Amendment due process. The court granted summary judgment on the due process claim. Because Mateu was responding to reported gunfire and a rapidly developing struggle over a gun, the court applied the requirement that the conduct must shock the conscience. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that Mateu acted with a purpose to harm Tindle for reasons unrelated to legitimate law-enforcement objectives.

Monell claim. The court granted summary judgment on the claim against BART and Chief Rojas based on alleged inadequate hiring, training, supervision, discipline, policies, or customs. Plaintiffs did not provide evidence raising a genuine factual dispute about those matters or showing that BART’s or Chief Rojas’s practices caused the shooting.

Bane Act. The court granted summary judgment on the California Bane Act claim. It found that plaintiffs had not provided evidence that Mateu acted with the specific intent to violate Tindle’s civil rights.

Wrongful-death negligence. The court denied summary judgment on the state-law negligence claim. It explained that police officers have a duty to use reasonable care when deciding to use deadly force and when using it. The same factual disputes concerning the reasonableness of Mateu’s conduct prevented summary judgment on this claim.

Punitive damages. The court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. It found no evidence that Mateu acted with the required intent or with the level of reckless indifference needed for such damages. The opinion also notes that plaintiffs sought punitive damages only against Mateu and did not dispute the limitation on punitive damages against BART.

Disposition

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim, including qualified immunity, and the state-law wrongful-death claim. She granted the motion as to all other claims and terminated the motion docketed as No. 32.