Ingersoll v. City of Del Rey Oaks

Background

Robert Ingersoll sued the City of Del Rey Oaks and Dino Pick under a federal civil-rights law, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights when they fired him from his position as a police officer. The defendants moved to dismiss Ingersoll’s second amended complaint.

Ingersoll alleged that he had a prior federal misdemeanor conviction that had been publicized by local media. He was placed on administrative leave in 2017 during an investigation into alleged workplace misconduct and was fired in March 2018. The opinion states that the notice of intent to terminate cited alleged false statements on his employment application, false statements during the investigation, and use of racial epithets while on and off duty. Ingersoll alleged that the investigation failed to interview certain witnesses and that then-councilmember and mayor Edelen orchestrated his termination.

Legal Standard

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage, the court generally accepts well-supported factual allegations as true and views them favorably to the person who brought the lawsuit. But a complaint must include enough facts to make liability reasonably plausible; conclusory statements and unsupported deductions are not enough.

Analysis

The court had previously ruled that Pick was a final policymaker for purposes of municipal liability, but that Ingersoll had not alleged an underlying constitutional violation. The court found that the second amended complaint did not fix that problem.

The additional allegations about Ingersoll’s misdemeanor conviction, Langford’s knowledge of it, and witnesses who were not interviewed did not show that the defendants fired Ingersoll solely because of the conviction. The court stated that the termination notice also identified alleged false statements and repeated use of racial epithets. The court further found that the notice described specific misconduct incidents and potential witnesses, contrary to Ingersoll’s allegation that the charges were vague.

As to the First Amendment claim, the court stated that Ingersoll did not necessarily have to allege that he actually engaged in protected political activity. He still had to allege facts plausibly showing that the defendants had an improper political motive. The court found only conclusory allegations that Edelen sought to remove politically disloyal employees and that Langford and his supporters did not support Edelen’s reelection. Ingersoll did not allege facts showing that the defendants believed he supported Langford or fired him because of that belief.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Ingersoll’s federal civil-rights claims. Because Ingersoll had failed to allege sufficient facts after three attempts, the court dismissed the second amended complaint without leave to amend. The court stated that no claims remained and that it would enter judgment for the defendants and against Ingersoll.